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Abstract
Experiments in Behavioral Economics have shown a diﬀerence in willing-
ness to pay and willingness to accept. In the most well-known example,
half of the subjects randomly received a mug. When they afterwards were
given the opportunity to trade, the mug owners on average stated a selling
price more than twice the buying price of the non-owners. Hence, ownership
changes preferences—the endowment eﬀect. Recent observations have, how-
ever, suggested that it is not the physical ownership, but rather the mental
attachment that matters. The basic idea with this PhD thesis is to explore
if and how this could be the case in internet auctions, where bidders might
experience a form of mental ownership of the item they are bidding for.
Generally this thesis therefore contributes by testing the boundaries of loss
aversion and Reference-Dependence in the ﬁeld.
The thesis consists of four articles—one theoretical and three empirical.
The data material is 18.000 auction with complete bidding histories from
the Scandinavian auction site Laurtitz.com. Empirically I show that if the
price is low during the auction it will on average end at a high level com-
pared to the valuation. The underlying reason is that low prices will attract
more bidders who, once they entered, will increase their bids. Another ob-
servations is that at least part of this increase in willingness to pay is due to
a “pseudo-endowment eﬀect” since increased mental ownership, i.e. having
had the leading bid in terms of time and dollars, will increase a bidder’s
probability to rebid when outbid. Basically, I can therefore conﬁrm the
predicted mechanisms of my model of a semi-rational Reference-Dependent
auction bidder in the theoretical paper.
A classic argument in Neoclassical economics is that experience will elim-
inate cognitive biases like the endowment eﬀect. However, this does not
seem to be the case in internet auctions. Bidders do seem to learn to bid
more sophisticated, but their pseud-endowment eﬀect is almost unaﬀected
by experience. In the last article I therefore conclude that what we learn is
not a matter of rationality, but a matter of feedback.
Resume
I en lang række eksperimenter har man observeret en ændring i præferencer
p˚a baggrund af ejerskab. En person vil s˚aledes have e´n pris, n˚ar han er sælger
og har ejerskab, og en anden pris, der er ca. halvt s˚a høj, n˚ar han er køber
og ikke har ejerskab. Man vænner sig s˚a at sige til ejerskabet og vil derfor
fokusere p˚a tabet af det, man ejer. Ide´en med denne ph.d.-afhandling er at
undersøge, hvis og hvordan det kommer til udtryk i internetauktioner, hvor
købere undervejs i auktionen ma˚ske f˚ar mentalt ejerskab. Dermed bidrager
denne ph.d.-afhandling til at udvikle og raﬃnere modeller fra “Behavioral
Economics” ved at teste p˚a eksisterende markedsdata.
Afhandling best˚ar af ﬁre artikler, hvoraf e´n er teoretisk og tre er empiriske.
Datagrundlaget best˚ar af 18.000 auktioner fra Lauritz.com over moderne
møbler fra 2005. Det viser sig, at hvis prisen er lav tidligt i auktionen,
ender prisen paradoksalt nok højt i sidste ende i gennemsnit. Det skyldes
udelukkende at lave priser tiltrækker ﬂere købere, som undervejs vil øge
deres bud. Derudover bliver købere ofte p˚avirket til øge deres betalingsvil-
lighed af at have haft det førende bud – især hvis deres max-bud har været
meget højere end den løbende auktionspris. Disse empiriske observationer
kan dermed bekræfte den teoretiske model over budadfærd fra den første ar-
tikel, hvor mentalt ejerskab skabes, n˚ar man er optimistisk omkring sandsyn-
ligheden for at vinde.
Neoklassisk økonomi hævder ofte, at irrationaliteter som ovenst˚aende “en-
dowment eﬀect” vil forsvinde med erfaring. Jeg kan dog med analysen i den
sidste empiriske artikel konkludere, at det ikke altid er tilfældet. Godt nok
lærer køberne at byde mere soﬁstikeret, men eﬀekten af mentalt ejerskab
ændres stort set ikke. Jeg vil derfor argumentere, at det, vi lærer, ikke er et
spørgsma˚l om rationalitet men om feedback.
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Preface
A PhD project is a long and (at times) stressing journey. Beginning in one
place, but ending up somewhere else—in my case, very far from the starting
point. Although I am not sure I can recommend this approach, I am very
satisﬁed with my journey.
This thesis is the main result of my PhD studies that began in February
2004. Now you probably wonder why I took so long, but before making the
obvious conclusion (...) my scholarship was a so-called 4+4 program. This
means that I was accepted as a PhD student before receiving my masters
degree. During the ﬁrst couple of years I was therefore also doing my master
thesis.
A 4+4 program is generally a very good idea – especially if you are able
to utilize the master thesis as a stepping stone. I entered the university as
a practical farmer and during my education in agricultural economics my
focus was on applying micro economics to Danish agriculture. My initial
work in my PhD program was therefore on applied Contract Theory and
on Benchmarking as decision support. This work resulted in three publi-
cations; 1) Contract Production of Broiler Chicken – my master thesis and
FOI Working Paper 4, 2005, 2) Interactive Benchmarking with examples
from agriculture, with Kurt Nielsen, Industry Report No 172, FOI, 2004,
and 3) Balanced Benchmarking, with Kurt Nielsen and Peter Bogetoft, In-
ternational Journal of Business Performance Management. 2006, 8(4):274 -
289. However, this focus completely changed with my stay at UC Berkeley.
My main motivation for applying for the 4+4 program was a required course
work of 60 ECTS (one year). This basically allows the PhD student to be
better theoretically equipped before starting the “production”. I was so
fortunate to get the opportunity to go to University of California, Berkeley,
to do most of my course work. During the academic year 2005/2006 I took a
mix of graduate course at Berkeley and it completely changed my perspective
on economics.
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I have been told that Economics at Berkeley is a bit special. Kahneman was
a professor at Berkeley from 1986 to 1994, and generally there is a positive
spirit towards “Psychology and Economics”—not only from people within
the ﬁeld, but also from hardcore micro and macro economists. When visitors
from e.g. MIT or Chicago presented at the “Psyc and Econ” seminar many
started by saying something like: “as this is Berkeley I will drop the usual
defense and go directly to the actual presentation...”.
My upbringing in this ﬁeld was basically two courses in “Psychology and
Economics” by Matthew Rabin and Ulrike Malmendier. Matthew Rabin is
brilliant at modeling theory. Whatever idea or pattern he comes across, he
will invent a model. Naturally, this inﬂuences his teaching and core areas
with relative well-developed models like Reference-Dependence or Present
Bias were thoroughly explored.
Ulrike Malmendier, on the other hand, is an empirical enthusiast. Her
classes, which I had the second semester, were all about exploring “the
wild”. We analyzed a vast amount of ﬁeld experiments and much of our
(free) time went with discussing ideas and data. Clearly, this upbringing
has had an immense inﬂuence on my project, and how I see the future of
economics.
Like many others I believe that Behavioral Economics will revolutionize
economics within the next ten years, and I would really like to contribute.
This is why I changed my initial project formulation and turned towards
Behavioral Economics when I returned from Berkeley.
In our part of the world the ﬁeld is still in the making. I would therefore like
to express my gratitude towards the many people who have supported me in
my choice. A special thanks to my supervisor Professor Peter Bogetoft who
has always been positive, competent and inspiring despite this not being
his ﬁeld. I would also like to give a special thanks to Professor Henrik
Hansen who in the ﬁnal phase was a great help. I hope we can continue our
many discussions in the years to come. Finally, I would like to thank Chris
Berridge and Lauritz.com for what turned out to be a prosperous data set.
Copenhagen, June 2008
Jens-Martin Bramsen
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Introduction
I am the most oﬀensively possessive man on earth. I do some-
thing to things. Let me pick up an ashtray from a dime-store
counter, pay for it and put it in my pocket—and it becomes a
special kind of ashtray, unlike any on earth, because it’s mine.
—Gail Wynand, from “The Fountainhead” by Ayn Rand
“Prospect Theory in the wild” is the title of a paper by Colin Camerer
(2000). In some sense it also describes the motivation behind this PhD
thesis. The objective with this introduction is to point out why the “wild”
(in my case internet auctions) is interesting and how it can contribute to
Behavioral Economics.
Naturally, internet auctions is a very fascinating ﬁeld in it self. Users all
over the world have adopted it as an entertaining and eﬃcient market place
where almost anything can be traded, and the result is immense. The 2007
numbers for eBay was 83 million active users and a Gross Merchandize Sales
of roughly 60 billion dollars (eBay, 2008). Still, the focus in this introduc-
tion reﬂects that I for this project ﬁrst and foremost see internet auctions
as a prosperous application. In other words, I will in this introduction ar-
gue how exploring the behavior in internet auctions can contribute to the
development of the theoretical framework which is evolving in the wake of
Prospect Theory.
“Prospect Theory” was originally developed in the late 1970s by Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979)—two researchers in psychology at
Stanford University. In 1980 their colleague at Stanford, the economist
Richard Thaler (1980), followed with “Towards a Positive Theory of Con-
sumer Choice”. Prospect Theory was henceforth extended into choices with
no uncertainty thereby explaining phenomena like the endowment eﬀect as
in the quotation above. Although the search for better descriptive models of
economic decision making certainly was not new, these articles basically ini-
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tiated a reintegration of psychology into economics1. The ﬁeld of Behavioral
Economics was born.
Where expected utility is based on a few axioms of rational choice, Prospect
Theory is based on psychological observations of human perception and
decision making. Though, Prospect Theory can be seen as a modiﬁcation
of the expected utility model. There are basically two elements in this
modiﬁcation; 1) In stead of a concave reference independent utility function,
u(), Prospect Theory suggests a Reference-Dependent utility function, v(),
where losses are valued more than equal-sized gains. Moreover, utility is
diminishing in both losses and gains. 2) Utility is not directly weighted
with probabilities. In stead probabilities are applied to a function, π(), to
obtain a decision weight that corresponds more closely to human perception
of probabilities. If ci denotes the outcome in state i, pi, the probability for
state i and r the reference point, then:
∑
i
pi · u(ci) is modiﬁed to
∑
i
π(pi) · v(ci|r)
It is safe to say that Behavioral Economics including Prospect Theory has
been (and still is to some degree) widely debated. Some even talk about the
“Behavioral wars” of the 1990s. Much of the initial work has therefore been
on gathering evidence for the existence and the generality of the underlying
cognitive biases. However, if Behavioral Economics is going to play a more
inﬂuential role in policy making, proving existence is vital, but only the ﬁrst
in a number of steps. Especially for the more developed parts of Behavioral
Economics, the focus has therefore shifted during the last 10 years. The
focus is now more on formal modeling and on exploring the boundaries for
the theories. This is the perspective with which the intensions of this thesis
should be seen.
Following Prospect Theory there have been multiple attempts to model
Reference-Dependence and loss aversion in a general framework. A recent
example is the “Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences” by Koszegi and
Rabin (2006). Although this is an elegant and intuitive model, it also dis-
plays some of the doubts and problems which needs to be resolved. An
excellent analysis of this issue can be found in a series of 4 articles in the
may 2005 issue of Journal of Marketing Research (JMR). Here a number
of key researchers reﬂect on the development and status of generalizing
Prospect Theory (See Novemsky and Kahneman (2005a), Camerer (2005),
Ariely et al. (2005), and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005b)). In the follow-
ing I will therefore use these articles as the main inspiration for discussing
1Bruni and Sugden (2007) argue that in classical economics there was no distinction
between psychology and economics, and modern psychology was only established as a
independent science in 1860 with Gustav Fechner’s book “Elemente der Psychophysik”.
The use of psychology in economics is therefore, in fact, a reintegration.
8
lacks and doubts in the theory. The idea is to clarify where I think this
thesis can contribute, and where future research is needed.
What is the Reference Point?
The key to any theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences is obviously the
reference point. However, the reference point is a delicate ingredient as it is
shifting. In fact, this is the central concept of the reference point. If it did
not change preferences would be constant.
The concept of an ever-shifting point of reference was initially proposed in
hedonic psychology. This is the so-called Adaptation Level Theory by Helson
(1947, 1964). The natural extension of this theory is that people adapt to
their current endowment. In the early literature current endowment was
therefore assumed to be the reference point—hence the endowment eﬀect.
However, the general understanding is now that there is more to it.
Ariely et al. (2005) and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005b) discuss how in-
tentions or anticipation can moderate loss aversion. For instance, if a trader
intents to sell an item, the experience of loss when selling it is likely to be
depressed. This might help to explain why some professional traders do not
exhibit the endowment eﬀect as observed by List (2003). Although they do
not explicitly discuss the reference point, the most straightforward way of
modeling this intuition is by adapting intentions and anticipations as the
reference point. Similarly, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) argue that the refer-
ence point is the decision maker’s “recent expectations”. If nurses, like in
the Danish 2008 wage negotiations, expect to get 15% in wage increase dur-
ing the next 3 years, a suggestion of 12.8% will (at least in part) be viewed
as a loss.
Intentions and recent expectations do sound like a reasonable and much
more general speciﬁcation of the reference point. The problem is, however,
that expectations and intensions are impossible to observe. In an application
the reference point must thus be speciﬁed explicitly. It is therefore crucial to
know how intensions and expectations are formed and developed over time.
Investigating this empirically is a main objective with this thesis.
The basic idea of the ﬁrst paper (“Loss aversion in internet auctions”) is
to theoretically predict the consequences of a certain type of dynamic refer-
ence point. Inspired by a Markov model of adaption in hedonic psychology
by Frederick and Loewenstein (1999), I specify the reference point as being
partly updated with recent beliefs about the auction outcome. Moreover,
these beliefs are deﬁned as being rational about probabilities. Thus, loss
aversion and a “pseudo-endowment” eﬀect are triggered by a disparity be-
tween the current probability to win and the reference point probability to
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win. As a consequence, bidders are increasing their bids the most if their
probability to win was high at some point earlier in the auction.
This observation points directly at the discussion in Ariely et al. (2005)
and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005b). They argue whether loss aversion
is triggered by a mental attachment or due to a cognitive focus. Where
cognitive focus suggests that it is the situation that leads to the focus on
losses, my model follows the idea of mental attachment and show that the
amount of mental ownership, i.e. probability to win, will matter directly for
the experience of loss.
Empirically, I am able to test this hypothesis in the empirical article “Re-
bidding?”, where I analyze the behavior of a carefully selected sample from
Laurtiz.com. The basic idea is that if a max-bid (which seems to be a bid-
der’s willingness to pay) is increased later in the auction this must reﬂect
an underlying change in preferences. Thus, as I ﬁnd two proxies for mental
ownership—“ownership time” and “depth”—to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability to rebid, I interpret this as a pseudo-endowment eﬀect. Since
“depth” is the distance from the bidder’s max-bid to the current price and
therefore a good measure of the bidder’s perception of the probability to
win, this is further support to the idea of mental attachment.
Boundaries for loss aversion
A recurring theme for the 4 articles in JMR is a discussion of when loss
aversion is triggered, and especially when is it not triggered. This could
be the case for money. You can argue that money is intended to be spent.
The reference point is therefore adjusted to this. For instance, people might
work with diﬀerent budgets for diﬀerent types of spending. In some sense
this is also an argument for mental accounts.
The items in my sample of internet auctions are all relatively expensive
furniture. However, with a sample of diﬀerent types of auction items one
might be able to distinguish the mental accounts used. Speciﬁcally, the loss
aversion for money spent on some (cheap or ordinary) items may be much
lower than money spent on other (expensive or unusual) items. This could
be reﬂected in the pseudo-endowment eﬀect for these items.
The discussion of utilitarian versus hedonic goods is closely related. For
example, Ariely et al. (2005) argue that special (hedonic) objects that ap-
peal to people’s emotions could trigger loss aversion more—especially if the
endowment eﬀect is invoked by mental attachment. Again, this could also
be a test for internet auctions, but again this was unfortunately not possible
with the data in my sample.
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To end this path I will also mention the discussion of hedonic dimensions
by Koszegi and Rabin (2004). Trading a chocolate bar for a mug is likely to
involve two diﬀerent hedonic dimensions and therefore trigger loss aversion.
However, trading a Snickers for a Mars bar may only involve one dimension
and hence not create a feeling of loss. Although I was not able to address this
question in this thesis, it appears to be an important and also prosperous
area for further research.
Laboratory vs. the Field
Loss aversion in real life versus the laboratory is another major question that
also points towards the boundaries of loss aversion. However, this discussion
is at the heart of my thesis and I will therefore treat it separately.
The development of laboratory experiments is perhaps the single most im-
portant reason behind the emergence of Behavioral Economics. The con-
trolled environment of a laboratory experiment allows researchers to explore
very speciﬁc questions, many of which simply cannot be asked in the ﬁeld.
Still, there are some doubts and drawbacks by using this method, and I am
convinced that we are now at a point where some of these issues can and
must be addressed by exploring the ﬁeld.
The objection that almost always come up when you talk to sceptical people
about laboratory experiments is the incentives to reveal preferences. Most
experiments do have monetary incentive for participants to state their true
underlying pretences, but sceptics point out that the incentive mechanism
may not always be understood, and that the money at stake is too low for
people to really care. There have been laboratory experiments with much
higher stakes which does not seem to change the results. For instance, Car-
penter et al. (2005) report that an increase in the stake from $10 to $100
does not change the results in the distribution games (dictator and ultima-
tum games). Still, for many it would be more convincing if the ﬁndings are
replicated in ﬁeld experiments.
Many experiments are set up with a revelation mechanism, i.e. the experi-
ment is constructed such that the participants’ strictly dominating strategies
are to directly reveal their preferences. However, if people are not rational
in the choices we test, it is naive to believe that they will always choose the
dominating strategy. Other eﬀects that are not measured, like framing or
priming, may have impact on the outcome. Ariely et al. (2004) also ques-
tion the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism which is commonly
used to elicit prices, e.g. in the endowment eﬀect experiments. Again, the
solution would be to conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the ﬁeld.
A natural ﬁrst step for ﬁeld experiments is to document that something
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non-standard is going on. For internet auctions this initial step has been
to study strategies and prices. A good example is Lee and Malmendier
(2006) who ﬁnd that the majority of bidders for a certain game on eBay end
up paying more than an available “Buy now” option also found on eBay2.
However, the attempts to connect strategies to ﬁnal prices on eBay have
been absent (or problematic). This is therefore the aim of the paper “Bid
early and get it cheap”, which shows that an early price increase will on
average result in lower prices. Moreover, the result implies that bidders
change their willingness to pay during the auction.
The major problem with ﬁeld experiments is that the ﬁeld is uncontrollable
and “messy”. One solution to this problem is to know exactly what to
look for. The main purpose of the theoretical paper is therefore to generate
speciﬁc research questions. As mentioned above, I propose that the pseudo-
endowment eﬀect is driven by time and “depth” of ownership, and this is
therefore the focus of the second empirical paper.
Another critique of laboratory experiments is that the problems and the
decisions are artiﬁcial and new to the participants. The argument is that
in a realistic setting people will gradually learn to make rational decision.
This is the topic of the ﬁnal empirical paper,“Learning to bid, but not
quit”, in which I analyze the eﬀect of experience on bidding behavior. The
conclusion is that bidders do learn to use max-bids and to bid earlier, but
they do not learn to control their pseudo-endowment eﬀects. I therefore
argue that learning is not a matter of rationality, but a matter of feedback.
To end this introduction, I think the amount of evidence from the ﬁeld is
surprisingly little considering the 30 years of existence—or at least that is
the impression you get, for instance, by looking at the reviews of Camerer
(2000) and DellaVigna (2007). Generally, my main motivation is therefore
to contribute to this research.
I will ﬁnish this introduction as I started it—with a quote. Although
Camerer here speaks of risk aversion vs. loss aversion, I think the argu-
ment holds for Behavioral Economics in general. To stay in the analog, my
vision for the ﬁeld is that we will be able to upgrade and make color tvs
available for more shows and more people.
It is possible to do economics by rooting risk attitudes entirely in
concave utility, but doing so is like stubbornly watching television
in black-and-white when you can watch it in color...
—Colin Camerer (2005)
2For a general review of the ﬁndings in internet auctions see Ockenfels (2006).
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Loss Aversion in Internet Auctions
– Theoretical predictions∗
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Abstract
This article investigates what loss aversion and Reference-Dependence
in isolation can offer to understand bidder behavior. Based on a sim-
plified version of Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model I analyze a utility
maximizing bidder who in all other aspect than Reference-Dependence
is completely rational. The key component is a dynamic reference
point which is updated during the auction. The model shows that a
Reference-Dependent bidder will always increase her bid up to the con-
sumption value and often beyond. This is done to avoid a loss in her
mental ownership—a pseudo-endowment effect. How far the bidder is
willing to go depends primely on the amount of attachment which, for
a semi-rational bidder, is created early in the auction when the price
is low. As a response competing bidders should bid early.
Keywords: Internet auctions, Reference-Dependent Preferences, Pseudo-
endowment, Bidding behavior, eBay, Strategies.
∗Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Peter Bogetoft, Anna Engelund, Jes Winther
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1 Introduction
Reference-Dependence is by now widely accepted as a fundamental charac-
teristic of human decision making. Not only psychologists, but also economist
have (reluctantly) adopted it for modification of neoclassical theory. Still,
the theory is not yet mature for real applications—for instance, as a tool for
policy making.
Most of the evidence of Reference-Dependence is based on laboratory exper-
iments. The question is therefore still how and to what extent Reference-
Dependence applies to actual decision making in real markets. More specif-
ically, how exactly does Reference-Dependence and loss aversion1 apply, for
instance, in a dynamic setting and to what extent does experience eliminate
the bias? A good example of this discussion can be found in the may 2005
issue of Journal of Marketing Research where key researchers reflect on the
boundaries of loss aversion in a series of articles (see e.g. Novemsky and
Kahneman (2005a), Camerer (2005), Ariely et al. (2005)).
The solution at this point is, in my opinion, to further develop the theory in
interaction with field experiments. Only with observations from real market
settings can the theory be confirmed and extended to the necessary degree
for policy making.
Internet auctions are an obvious subject for empirical investigation. Auction
sites like eBay.com is becoming ever more important, and the amount of
available data is remarkable. Furthermore, it may have just the dynamics
one would look for. Not only is much of the current decision making recorded
as bidding, but the bidder can often be tracked from one auction to the other.
Perhaps the most famous consequence of Reference-Dependence and loss
aversion is the disparity between Willingness to pay (WTP) and Willingness
to accept (WTA). This difference is seen as a consequence of ownership—
hence the term the endowment effect. Yet, recent experiments have revealed
that physical possession is not in itself a necessity to trigger loss aversion
(Sen and Johnson, 1997; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998; Carmon et al.,
2003). In other words, bidders in an internet auction might create mental
ownership for the item they are bidding for, causing them to increase their
WTP. Like Prelec (1990) I will label this the pseudo-endowment effect2.
1Loss aversion is in the literature often implicitly assumed by Reference-Dependence
and vice-versa. I will more or less take the same approach.
2Prelec (1990) uses this term in a more general theoretical framework, but the appli-
cation on internet auctions is not new. Ariely et al. (2004) approach it in the laboratory
and Wolf et al. (2005) try empirically in eBay auctions, but with some problems.
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Empirically it is tricky to find clear evidence for the pseudo-endowment effect
in real auction data. Internet auctions are often seen as fun, exiting and
dramatic. Increasing bids are the norm, and besides the pseudo-endowment
effect there might be a whole set of other psychological and strategic effects.
In order to distinguish the pseudo-endowment effect from other explanations,
one must therefore know exactly what to question. The objective of this
article is to generate such research questions for future empirical studies.
This is done by exploring the pseudo-endowment effect from a theoretical
angle.
Although auctions can be strategic games, the main objective is to explore
the mechanisms within the decision maker. I therefore develop a model of
a single Reference-Dependent utility maximizer. And in order to fully focus
on the effect of the inconsistent preferences, all other aspects of this bidder
are modeled as rational. I label this “semi-rationality”.
As the starting point I use Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) recent model of
Reference-Dependent Preferences. However, adjustments must be made in
order to actually obtain a pseudo-endowment effect. First of all, I sim-
plify their utility function for a fully stochastic setting in order for a semi-
rational bidder to experience enough loss. Second, their reference point is
self-fulfilling (rational expectations), but obviously this cannot be the case
here. The main point is exactly that bidders end up changing the reference
point and thus their preferences. I therefore specify a Markov model for
updating the reference point.
The resulting model does give some insight in the underlying mechanics of
the pseudo-endowment effect. A bidder who enters when the price is low
will get used to the prospect of buying. Only later, when the price increases,
will the focus shift towards payment. A loss averse utility maximizer will
therefore be caught between losing the opportunity to win or the loss of
paying more than expected. In this “race” the pseudo-endowment effect will
always dominate up to the intrinsic valuation and in many cases also beyond,
depending on the price increase and the amount of mental attachment. The
advice for competing bidders is therefore either to increase the price early to
prevent attachment or to increase the price rapidly to provoke a large loss
of money.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model of a
Reference-Dependent and loss averse bidder. Section 3 explores the ba-
sic results of bidding behavior, and these are extended to a dynamic setting
in Section 4. Section 5 evaluates the consequences for selling and bidding
strategies and Section 6 discusses and concludes.
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2 A model of auction bidding
A bid is a commitment to pay an amount in case it is the winning bid.
Yet more generally, a bid is the choice of a lottery with probabilities for
prices and the chance to win. Moreover, in a dynamic internet auction these
probabilities will change during the auction period.
The basic idea is that the changes will create a disparity between what a
bidder used to believe (the reference point) and what the bidder now beliefs
(the current outcome) and that this disparity will make the bidder revise her
bid. The basic building blocks in a model are therefore the reference lottery,
G(), the current beliefs about outcome, F (), and the decision rule, U(),
that optimizes the bid according to the Reference-Dependent Preferences.
In other words, the basic decision problem at time t is a utility maximization
problem:
max
Ft
U(Ft()|Gt()) (1)
How exactly U(), Ft(), and Gt() are defined for a semi-rational bidder is
discussed below, but for now suppose U() is some Reference-Dependent
utility function and that Ft() and Gt() are both well-defined lotteries over
money and auction items.
The crucial feature of any Reference-Dependent model is the reference point.
Since you can shape the outcome by shaping the reference point this is also
a particularly tricky question. A clever way to avoid this problem is by
making the reference point self-fulling as done in the equilibrium analysis of
Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Yet, the key idea behind the pseudo-endowment
effect is that people end up doing something else than initially intended. In
this framework such behavior must be explained by a change in the reference
point for loss averse bidders (Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991). The starting
point for this analysis is therefore to come up with a reference point that is
dynamically updated during the auction.
2.1 Pseudo-endowment and the reference point
Originally the endowment effect was put forward by Thaler (1980) to ex-
plain the effect of ownership on differences between buying and selling prices.
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) insight in loss aversion and Reference-
Dependence was thereby extended into riskless choices. Although there was
some speculation on the reference point in the early literature, it was (as the
name suggests) generally assumed that the reference point was the decision
maker’s current endowment.
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The most famous example of the endowment effect is the “mugs experiment”
by Kahneman et al. (1990). After half of the subjects in the experiment was
randomly given a mug, the mug owners on average stated a valuation more
than twice the amount of the non-owners. Thus, physical possession and
ownership do clearly change the reference point. The question is, if and how
weaker beliefs, like the anticipation of winning an auction, can affect the
reference point.
There is some evidence in the literature that physical possession is, in fact,
not a necessity. Merely thoughts about the ownership can trigger loss aver-
sion. Sen and Johnson (1997) show that merely having a coupon for a good
enhances the attachment to it. Carmon and Ariely (2000) note that selling
and buying prices are independent of whether the subjects actually owned
a ticket or if they were simply encouraged to imagine that they did.
Ariely et al. (2005) and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005b) discuss whether
this is a result of some sort of cognitive ownership or if it is simply due
to the cognitive focus. Neither way, it will lead to higher valuation due to
loss aversion. With a Reference-Dependent model it is only through the
reference point (as pseudo-endowment) that the effect will occur.
For a bidder in an auction the perception of ownership must derive from a
chance to win the auction. If you take the focusing point of view, simply
having a chance to win, for instance by having the leading bid or imag-
ining that you do, can make you focus on the loss of not winning. Just
participating in the auction will therefore affect the reference point to some
ownership.
Yet, as this is a semi-rational bidder a experience of ownership must build
on a rational view on the chance to win. This is exactly how F () will be
defined. In words, F () will be the rational beliefs about the probability
distribution for the outcome of the auction.
The reference point will for a semi-rational bidder also build on rational be-
liefs about probabilities, but for the reference point it must be past beliefs.
A reasonable model of the reference point at time t for a semi-rational bid-
der can therefore be based directly on past beliefs represented by the prior
probability distributions:
Gt() = h(Ft−1(), Ft−2(), Ft−3(), ..., F0()) (2)
Note that ownership is only one part of the reference point. The other part
is about getting used to paying for the item. But as F () is defined over both
money and auction items this is automatically also a part of the reference
point.
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The next step is to determine how this process of updating goes on, i.e. the
function h(). A basic observation must be that people form their reference
point when they direct their attention to it (Friedman and Scholnick, 1997).
Hence, h() must vary quite a lot both inter- and intra-personal. Clearly
there are different factors that can trigger this focus and the attachment to
the item. Carmon et al. (2003) utilize such triggers to increase the subjects
loss aversion towards a foregone option. Among these triggers was physical
proximity, prior ownership and hedonic vs. utilitarian choices, but such
factors are difficult to incorporate in a simple model.
Carmon et al. (2003) do, however, also utilize a more general factor: Time.
The more time you have available to focus on information, the more likely it
is for you to actually focus on it and adjust your reference point. Empirically
this is shown by Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) in a variation of the
mugs experiment, where the length of ownership has a significant effect on
the endowment effect. This effect must also generalize into the pseudo-
ownership of an auction, where a bidder gradually gets used to the idea of
buying. As a consequence, the reference point must somehow gradually be
adjusted towards ownership.
A model that can represent such an adjustment is a version of the lagged
model suggested by Frederick and Loewenstein (1999). In this model the
reference point G() at time t is a linear function of the reference point and
the beliefs at time t− 1:
Gt() = αFt−1() + (1− α)Gt−1() (3)
The parameter α characterizes how much this particular bidder focuses her
attention towards new information. For the limiting case α = 0 no new
information is added to the reference point and this will therefore remain
unchanged. For α = 1 it is only the very recent beliefs that are relevant, i.e.
she focuses so much on the auction that only the very recent information
forms the reference point. Thus, history does not matter. I will argue
that prior beliefs will not always disappear just because you receive new
information. Earlier expectations might be carried along to some degree—
maybe just as a gut feeling. I will therefore assume: 0 > α > 1.
Although this reference point is quit mechanical its intuition is not far from
that of the literature. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) use the term “Recent
Expectations” to describe the reference point. If you, before going to a wage
negotiation, expect to get a wage increase of say $5,000, it must feel like a
loss if you “only” get $3,000. Recent Expectations define very intuitively
how this comparison is done.
Naturally, once this must be operationalized the flexibility must somehow
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be restrained. The solution of Koszegi and Rabin (2006) is, as mentioned,
to make the recent expectations self-fulfilling, i.e. you will always follow
through on your plans. As the purpose of this article is to investigate what
can happen outside such equilibria, I interpret Recent Expectations as a
mixture of prior beliefs.
2.2 Reference-Dependent Preferences
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) present a very appealing and intuitive general-
ization of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory that can facilitate a
stochastic outcome and reference point. By ignoring the probability weight-
ing of Prospect Theory they basically model the decision maker as rational
about probabilities but with Reference-Dependent preferences. You could
call this a Reference-Dependent - von Neumann-Morgenstern (RD-vNM)
utility function. This is exactly what is needed to describe the semi-rational
but loss averse bidder, and for now this model is the starting point3.
Following the notation of Koszegi and Rabin (2006) a decision maker’s utility
depends on the K-dimensional consumption (outcome) bundle, c ∈ ℜK , and
the K-dimensional reference bundle, r ∈ ℜK . For k = 1, ...,K the total
utility in a deterministic situation is defined by:
u(c|r) = m(c) + n(c|r) =
∑
k
m(ck) +
∑
k
n(ck|rk) (4)
A person’s utility consists of two elements; m(c) which is standard outcome-
based “consumption” utility and n(c|r) which is “gain-loss” utility—both
separable between dimensions. This way the model can capture situations
where gain-loss utility would be the driving factor, but also situations where
the level of absolute outcomes are so dominating that gains and losses must
be of minor importance.
In addition, there is a close relationship between the consumption utility of a
good, m(ck) and its gain-loss utility in the sense that n(ck|rk) = µ(mk(ck)−
mk(rk)). µ() is a universal gain-loss function closely related to the value
3There are surely other utility models with Reference-Dependent properties that can
facilitate this situation, but these are not as intuitive and simple as Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) or Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Sugden (2003) e.g. presents a very general model
using a Savage style axiomatic framework, but Reference-Dependence and loss aversion do
in his model only apply within the same state of the world. There are also other models
of non-expected utility that could be of interest. In particular, I think of Disappointment
Theory by Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986) (and in an axiomatic framework Gul
(1991)) . Yet, applied directly they do not include loss aversion, but as it turns out, I
will to some extend use their simple view of a reference as a Certainty Equivalent in my
modification.
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function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where losses are more important
than equal sized gains, and sensitivity is diminishing in both losses and
gains.
In a stochastic setting F () and G() are the cumulative distributions of prob-
abilities over all possible consumption bundles, c, and reference bundles , r,
respectively. In this case total utility is defined as:
U(F |G) =
∫
c
∫
r
u(c|r)dG(r)dF (c) (5)
In words, every possible consumption bundle c in F is compared with every
possible reference bundle r in G and weighted by their probabilities. Thus,
every specific outcome can feel partly as a loss, and partly as a gain and the
total utility will be an average of those feelings.
It can be quite difficult to see the consequences of the full model, so let us
consider a simple discrete example. Consider a situation where the decision
maker has a reference lottery of $0 and $10 with 50/50 chance. For simplicity
assume that the consumption utility is linear withm($0) = 0 andm($1) = 1.
If the outcome turns out to be $5 for sure, the utility will be:
U(c|G(r)) = 5 +
gain compared to 0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.5 · µ(5− 0) +
loss compared to 10︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.5 · µ(5− 10)
If the outcome was another lottery, say $2 and $8 with 50/50 chance, total
utility would in stead be:
U(F(c)|G(r)) =
consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.5 · 2 + 0.5 · 8+
gain compared to 0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.5(0.5 · µ(2− 0) + 0.5 · µ(8− 0))
+
loss compared to 10︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.5(0.5 · µ(2− 10) + 0.5 · µ(8− 10))
Although this is a very intuitive method to generalize Reference-Dependent
Preferences into a fully stochastic model, the problem is that this exact
specification actually cannot facilitate a pseudo-endowment effect. To realize
this, consider the following simplified decision problem for a bidder in an
internet auction.
Suppose c1 is the outcome in the money dimension and c2 is the outcome in
the item dimension, and that the bidders has linear consumption utility as
before of m(c1 = 0) = 0, m(c1 = 1) = 1, m(c2 = 0) = 0, and m(c2 = 1) =
100. That is, one dollar has a consumption utility of 1, and the item she is
bidding for has a consumption utility of 100.
Suppose also that the bidder has formed the reference point that she is going
to win the auction with some probability qr. To simplify she expects to pay
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exactly the equivalent of the consumption value if she buys, i.e. her reference
point is to pay $100 with probability qr and $0 with probability (1− qr).
Now she gets the opportunity to either leave and get nothing/pay nothing or
to stay and get probability qc to win/pay $100 as before. Since consumption
utility is zero no matter if she buys or not, consider the gain-loss utility of
her choices. If she decides to leave, she will get a gain of saved money and
a loss of item:
Gain of payment︷ ︸︸ ︷
qr · µ(0−−100)+
Loss of item︷ ︸︸ ︷
qr · µ(0− 100)
If she decides to stay, her gain-loss utility in the payment dimension will be:
Loss of not paying before but paying now︷ ︸︸ ︷
qc(1− qr) · µ(−100 − 0) +
Gain of paying before but not paying now︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− qc)qr · µ(0−−100)
and the gain-loss utility in the item dimension will be:
Gain of not buying item before but buying now︷ ︸︸ ︷
qc(1− qr) · µ(100 − 0) +
Loss of buying item before but not buying now︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− qc)qr · µ(0− 100)
Hence, she decides to stay if4:
⇔ qr ≥ 1/2
No matter the new probability to win, qc, the bidder will only experience
enough loss to stay if the reference point probability is weakly greater than
50%. In a more comprehensive model the corresponding interpretation is
that a bidder will only stay and increase her bid if the reference point prob-
ability to win is sufficiently high, or if the payment is sufficiently low.
The conclusion can be that in a realistic auction setting the probability
to win will mostly be insufficient for the bidder to experience a pseudo-
endowment effect. However, I suspect that this is not always the case—
even for a bidder with a rational perception of the probabilities. If you are
not completely convinced in this matter, I have also performed a scenario
using the full model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Basically, I am using the
framework of Section 4, only the utility function will be precisely that of
Koszegi and Rabin (2006). This can be found in the Appendix.
The reason behind this lack of pseudo-endowment effect is that the model of
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) measures gains/losses of all changes. In terms of
the simple 50/50 lotteries of $0/$10 and $2/$8 from before, I suspect that
a decision maker will mostly focus on the increase from $0 to $2 and the
decrease from $10 to $8, while the model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006) puts
4Since µ(−100)/µ(100) < −1
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equal weight on the “change” from $10 to $2 and from $0 to $8. I will argue
that in some cases only the “net changes” will be viewed as losses and gains.
For the auction example the “Loss of buying item before but not buying
now” must be counteracted with “Gain of not buying item before but buying
now”, such that only the net change in probability to win matters. If the
probability to win is decreasing, the net change will be a loss in the item
dimension, and if the probability to win is increasing this is a gain in the
item dimension. Similarly, it is the net gain or loss of payment in the money
dimension that must matter for a bidder.
Note that this problem only appears if both the reference point and the
outcome are stochastic. I will certainly not argue that the model of Koszegi
and Rabin (2006) is generally incorrect, but I will argue that its approach
does not seem intuitive here. My intuition is that the pseudo-endowment
effect must be about loss of item versus loss of paying more—even with low
probabilities to win as the probability to pay will be equally low.
In order to facilitate this intuition, the model needs to apply gain/loss util-
ity on some measure of the net change for every dimension. The simplest
possible measure of net change is the change in expected consumption utility.
Hence in stead of measuring losses and gains between every reference point
and outcome, I will only compare expected consumption utility between the
reference point and the outcome for each dimension. This modified model
for gain-loss utility is thereby somewhat similar to the model of disappoint-
ment aversion presented by Loomes and Sugden (1986). This simplified
version of Koszegi and Rabin’s model can be written as:
U(F |G) =
∑
k=1,2
(
Consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
ck
m(ck)dF (ck)+µ(
E[CU] outcome lottery︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
ck
m(ck)dF (ck) −
E[CU] reference lottery︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
rk
m(rk)dG(rk) ))
(6)
Notice that although this model does not give room for the mixed feeling
of losses and gains within dimensions, the mixed feeling of losses and gains
between dimensions is maintained. Being outbid will, for instance, feel partly
as a loss of item and partly as a gain of money.
3 Auction bidding—static results
Suppose the internet auction is a second price auction where the current
winning price, pt, is the current second highest bid. Except for a prescribed
bid increase above the second highest bid (the bid increment), this is very
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similarly to the proxy bidding of e.g. eBay. The consequence of this proce-
dure is that the price the bidder is going to pay will be an outcome of the
bidding of others.
I assume that the bidder bases these beliefs on a single underlying proba-
bility distribution of the price such that only the current auction price and
her bid will matter for the determination of Ft()
5. If ck denote the out-
come of good k, pt the current auction price, and bt her bid, the bidder is
therefore choosing the cumulative probability distribution, F (ck|pt, bt), that
maximizes her utility.
In Figure 1 this setup is illustrated using a simple Uniform distribution of
prices as the bidder’s underlying beliefs about the outcome of prices, where
(a) illustrates the outcome of money (c1) and (b) the outcome of auction
items (c2). Paying any amount is negative. Higher payments are therefore
further to the left. Notice that the choice of F (c1|pt, bt) is also a choice of
F (c2|pt, bt), as the probability of paying more than zero, q
t, corresponds to
the probability of winning (while not winning is (1− qt)).
At time t the cumulative probability distributions from two different bids,
bˆ, b˜, are illustrated. As b˜ is the “highest” bid, the probability to win given
this bid, q˜, is the highest.
−bˆ−b˜
Ft(c1|pt, bˆ)
Ft(c1|pt, b˜)
−pt
Probability
1
qˆ
q˜
c1
(a) Payments in dollars
Ft(c2|pt, bˆ)
Ft(c2|pt, b˜)
1− qˆ
1− q˜
c2
Probability
1
1
(b) Number of items
Figure 1: Beliefs conditional on bids
5In other words, I assume that any bidder will form some probability distribution for
this particular auction before entering. This could for instance be the situation if the
bidder is well-founded from observing previous auctions. You could argue that a bidder
could become more optimistic and adjust the probabilities if, for instance, the price is
stable for a long time and no new bidders enter. Yet, I doubt that this kind of “soft”
information should actually influence rational bidder’s beliefs about the outcome—at least,
if the bidder is not extremely experienced in observing auctions developing.
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A consequence of the bidder’s semi-rationality is that she will update her
beliefs according to Bayes rule. More specifically, when the current auc-
tion price, pt+1, has increased (negatively), she will update her new beliefs,
Ft+1(c1|pt+1, bt+1), according to the fact that prices between pt+1 and pt
are no longer possible. In other words, the underlying probability density
function is truncated below the current price. This is also the reason why
Ft(c1|pt, b˜t) and Ft(c1|pt, bˆt) are flat between pt and zero.
I will assume that the auction is a pure private value auction. Also, there are
no other similar auctions running at the same time. The only information
relevant to the bidder in the course of the auction is therefore her probability
to win and what she might end up paying6.
Now, suppose the bidder has the Reference-Dependent utility function of
Equation (6). As before, I will assume linear consumption utility where
m(c1 = 1) = 1 and m(c2 = 1) = 100. To further simplify, I will assume
gain-loss utility, µ(), in the sense that µ′+(0) = 1 and µ
′
−
(0) = λ. Hence, I
am completely ignoring diminishing sensitivity both in consumption utility
and gain-loss utility7.
A semi-rational bidder will naturally bid in order to maximize utility. The
simplest way to analyze the bidding is therefore to look at the first order
condition and focus on marginal utility. Basically, a bidder will increase the
bid until the positive utility from increasing the probability to win is exactly
counteracted with the negative utility from increasing expected payment. I
will use the same notation as above so that the reference point probability
to win is qr and the current probability to win is qc. Formally, qct can be
measured as Ft(c1|pt, bt) for c1 = 0− ǫ where ǫ is a small number cf. Figure
1, but this heavy notation will not be necessary.
Entering the auction
If a bidder has the reference point of not participating in the auction, i.e.
not paying anything and not winning with certainty, the entry bid will be
straightforward in the sense that increasing the bid will be a gain in the item
dimension and a loss in the payment dimension. In other words, the reference
point will have no marginal effect. The bidder will therefore maximize utility
6A rational bidder would obviously not even need this information since she would just
bid her valuation. However, probabilities are relevant with these preferences.
7This is similar to assumption A3’ of Koszegi and Rabin (2006), only I also assume
η = 1, i.e. equal weight on gain-loss utility and consumption utility. For λk = 3 the
observed loss aversion in total utility will equal, (1 + λ)/(1 + 1) = 2, which corresponds
to the widespread observation of losses being valued twice the same sized gains.
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by setting the entry bid, b1 as:
∂U
∂b1
=
Marginal consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
(100 − b1) ·
dqc
db1
+
Marginal gain - item︷ ︸︸ ︷
100 ·
dqc
db1
−
Marginal loss - money︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · b ·
dqc
db1
= 0
⇔ b1 = 200/(λ + 1)
Notice that the bid is independent of the increase in probability, dqc/db1,
since the gain of 100 is surpassed by the loss of money beyond a bid of
b1 = 200/(λ + 1) no matter the marginal increase in probability, dq
c/db1.
This bid corresponds exactly to the maximum price in Koszegi and Rabin
(2006) where the consumer will buy regardless of her reference point of not
buying 8
Now, suppose in stead the reference point when entering is to buy with
certainty for a price of br. Then bidding up to br will not be viewed as a loss
but as a foregone gain, whereas there will be a loss in the item dimension
no matter. Two cases therefore need to be considered. 1) When the entry
bid is below the reference price, b1 < b
r:
Marginal consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
(100 − b1) ·
dqc
db1
+
Marginal re-gain of loss- item︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · 100 ·
dqc
db1
−
Marginal foregone gain - money︷ ︸︸ ︷
b1 ·
dqc
db1
= 0
⇔ b1 = 50(λ+ 1)
And 2) when the entry bid is above the reference price, b1 ≥ b
r:
Marginal consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
(100 − b1) ·
dqc
db1
+
Marginal regain of loss- item︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · 100 ·
dqc
db1
−
Marginal loss - money︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · b1 ·
dqc
db1
= 0
⇔ b1 = 100
In words, if the reference price, br, is above 100 (the consumption utility
of the item) the bidder will enter with a bid corresponding to the reference
price, b1 = b
r, up to a max of 50(λ+ 1). If the reference price is below 100,
the bidder will enter with a bid of 100 - corresponding to the consumption
utility of the item.
8In an example of shopping with λ = 3 Koszegi and Rabin (2006) find an interval of 50
to 200 pct of the consumption value, in which it is an equilibrium strategy to buy if you
expect to buy, or not to buy if you expect not to do so. In other words, if the price is below
50 pct of the consumption value, you would buy no matter the reference point. Similarly
will the maximum price with intentions to buy be at 200 pct. of the consumption value.
This will also correspond to the absolute maximum bid I find below.
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Naturally, the bidder could also enter with a stochastic reference point. This
decision is precisely like the bidding during the auction, which is explored
below.
Bidding during the auction
Once the bidder is part of the auction, the dynamics begins. For instance,
if the bidder enters with a reference point of not buying she will gradually
get used to buying (get mentally attached). How exactly this dynamics
will affect the bidding is quite complex as it will be a result of a series
of utility maximization and corresponding updates of the reference point.
In this section I will simply assume that bidder will slowly adjust to new
information as specified in Equation (3) and that the price in the auction
will increase. The more specific dynamic effects will be analyzed in a number
of computations in section 4.
As the auction evolves and new beliefs are gradually absorbed in the refer-
ence point this could lead the bidder to revise her bid. Basically, there are
two cases that would change the entry analysis. 1) as the current price, pt,
increases this would eventually cause the bidder to gain money compared
to the reference point and 2) the increasing price would also lead the cur-
rent probability to win, qct , to decrease below the reference point probability
to win, qr
t
. Which case to occur first depends on the situation and the
probability distribution, but let me analyze each case separately.
With an unchanged bid and a rising price the expected payment in the ref-
erence point will eventually become lower than the actual expected payment
since low prices are no longer probable. In that case, increasing the bid will
not be a loss, but a “foregone gain” in payment. Formally, this will be the
case until9: ∫
−pt
−bt
m(c1)dF (c1) ≥
∫
0
−bt−1
m(r1)dG(r1) (7)
When this condition is fulfilled, the marginal optimization of the bid will
be:
Consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
(100− bt) ·
dqc
t
dbt
+
Gain - item︷ ︸︸ ︷
100 ·
dqc
t
dbt
−
Foregone gain - money︷ ︸︸ ︷
bt ·
dqc
t
dbt
= 0 ⇔ bt = 100
Up to a bid of 100 (the consumption utility) the bidder will increase the bid
when the expected payment goes below that of the reference point.
The other case is if the current probability to win, qct , drops below that
9Technically the integral does not need to be bounded since the probabilities outside
of these limits are zero. Note also that the integral is in the negative domain.
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of the reference point, qrt . Then the pseudo-endowment effect will kick in.
Formally, qc will decrease as a consequence of increasing auction prices,
pt due to the conditional probability distribution Ft(c2|pt, bt). Thus, if pt
increases sufficiently with bt = bt−1 = bt−2... then q
c
t ≤ q
r
t , at some point.
The consequence is that she will experience a regain of loss of item up to
qc
t
≥ qr
t
when she increases her bid. The marginal analysis will therefore be:
Consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
(100 − bt) ·
dqct
dbt
+
Regain of loss - item︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · 100 ·
dqct
dbt
−
Loss - money︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · bt ·
dqct
dbt
= 0 ⇔ bt = 100
In this case the bidder will also increase the bid up to 100 (the consumption
utility) in order to “defend her position” , i.e. to avoid a loss in her mental
ownership.
Naturally, these two cases will often happen simultaneously as the increase
in price will affect both the current probability to win, qct , and the expected
payment. If this is the case, a marginal increase in the the bid will result
in a regain of item while missing a foregone gain in money. Hence, up until
one of the two conditions from above is binding, the marginal analysis will
be:
Consumption utility︷ ︸︸ ︷
(100 − bt) ·
dqc
t
dbt
+
Regain of loss - item︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ · 100 ·
dqc
t
dbt
−
Foregone gain - money︷ ︸︸ ︷
bt ·
dqc
t
dbt
= 0 ⇔ bt = 50(λ + 1)
Thus, she will bid up to bt = 50(λ + 1) in order to avoid a loss of item
by paying an amount she thought she should have payed anyway. This
corresponds to the maximum entry bid from above, and more generally to
the maximum price limit of Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
From these bidding decisions the overall pattern starts to stand out. The
initial reference point will influence the entry bid to a large extent, and low
entry bids compared to the consumption value can be expected. However,
once the bidder get some expectations to win, she will not hesitate to increase
her bid up to the consumption value if “possible” c.f. case 1) or “necessary”
c.f. case 2). Thus, no matter what, she will “defend her position” at least
up to the consumption value. Note that this pseudo-endowment effect is not
related to “ownership time” per se as bidders always will defend whatever
ownership they have.
Above the consumption value, she will also to some extend increase her bid
in order to avoid a loss of item. However, this will only be done to the extent
that it is a foregone gain of money. The amount with which she is willing
to increase her bid will therefore drop asymptotic towards zero as the price
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increases above the consumption value. Once her bid reaches bt = 50(λ+1)
she will drop out.
If the bidder is going to bid the absolute maximum of 200 it will in many
cases take numerous of ever smaller bid increases—a pattern that is unlikely
to happen in reality. Obviously, there will only be a limited number of
times to rebid, but more importantly, the necessary price increase to stay
in the auction may be much higher than the bidder is willing to pay. This
could be the case if the competition is scarce and the auction price increases
rapidly, but it can also be the result of the minimum increment most internet
auctions use. What will matter for the maximum bid is therefore the speed
at which the reference point of winning and paying is created and how fast
it will wear out. These are the main questions for the dynamic setup in the
next section.
4 Dynamic computations
This section reports the results of different types of bidders in a virtual
auction. Although bidding will be a result of a simple utility maximization,
the dynamics of the reference point and the effect of price increase will be
difficult to manage manually. Using [R] as the computational environment,
a numerical optimization is performed for a series of periods for a given set
of parameters constituting the bidder10. The results of these computations
will in part be shown as graphs printed by [R].
To keep it simple, the setup will be repeated for all computations. The
variation is therefore only centered round the bidder and the consequences
of her intentions, beliefs and preferences.
The virtual auction is to a large extend inspired by eBay, but naturally much
simpler. The auction will be a second price auction with a running price
(the current second price), but as eBay, and most other auction sites, there
is a required increment. The minimum bid will therefore be the current
price plus 2.5%11.
To get an idea of the bidding in all aspects of the auction, the bidder will
enter immediately after the auction is listed. To get a reasonable detailed
description of the bidding there will be t = 1, ..., 20 periods, i.e. the bidder
10R is a free language and environment for statistical computing. For more information
see http://www.r-project.org/
11For most auction sites this increment varies between 1% and 3% of the current price,
e.g $1 at $50 (Yahoo, 2005; Amazon, 2006; eBay, 2006).
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will observe and be able to bid 20 times. These 20 periods may not be
equally distributed during the auction period of e.g. 7 days which is the
typical for eBay. The periods could, for instance, be logistically distributed
in such a way that ln(21) is the expiry and ln(t) is the time for period t.
This structure could imitate a bidder with increasing focus near the end.
In the second price auction the current auction price will reflect the bidding
of other bidders. To get a consistent impression of the mechanisms in play
this will be particular simple with a linear price increase of $10 between each
period. Starting from zero the auction will therefore reach a price of $200
by the time of expiration. With λ = 3 ⇒ bmax = 200 this will be sufficient
to test when the bidder will drop out.
Base scenario: Anna
The virtual bidder of the base scenario I will name Anna. Anna enters the
auction with no intentions, i.e. her reference point is zero in both dimensions.
Like all other bidders Anna will have preferences as above, i.e. linear gain-
loss and consumption utility, where m(c1 = 1) = 1 and m(c2 = 1) = 100.
Specifically for Anna she has a loss aversion of λ = 3. Moreover, Anna
updates her reference point with a speed of α = 0.25, i.e. her reference
point Gt() consists of 25% of last period’s beliefs, Ft−1(), and 75% of last
period’s reference point, Gt−1().
Anna believes that the price for this item is normally distributed with
N(80, 502). Thus, Anna’s first period’s beliefs, F (c1|0, b1), has a under-
lying normal distribution truncated at zero and with 99% probability of a
price within 200.
Anna’s bidding is illustrated in Figure 2(a). As predicted she will initially
bid b1 = 50 and keep this bid until her current beliefs will fall below those of
her reference point (Case 1 & 2). As shown in Figure 2(b) it is the decreasing
probability to win (Case 2) that motivates her to increase her bid in period
5. This is the pseudo-endowment effect in play, and up to a price of 100 she
will fully defend her position.
Above the price of 100 she will prefer only to increase her bid up to the
amount she is saving from the price increases compared to the reference
point. This means that she partly experiences a loss of item. However, in
period 12 she is restricted by the 2.5% increment as bidding in absolute
terms is better than dropping out as shown in Figure 2(d) she prefers to
stay in. This “forced” bidding stabilizes her probability to win for a few
periods. In period 15 the required bid is too much in the sense that the
absolute utility of dropping out is less negative than that of rebidding. Her
maximum bid is therefore $133.25 in period 14.
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(d) Bid or drop out?
Figure 2: The bidding of Anna
Another way of analyzing Anna’s decisions is by looking at the two di-
mensions separately. If Anna would drop out she would gain some money
compared to the reference point. By adding this opportunity cost of a fore-
gone gain to the possible loss of paying more when bidding, we have the
total costs of (re)bidding. These costs are illustrated by “payment” in Fig-
ure 2(c). The benefit from (re)bidding is partly to avoid the loss of item and
partly (if so) a gain of item compared to the reference point. These benefits
are illustrated with “item”12.
By bidding there is of course also the consumption utility. Up to a price
of 100 this is a benefit, and above, it is a cost. The consumption utility is
added to the benefits of the item constitution a “net benefit” from bidding.
Anna’s decision is naturally to bid (optimally) as long as the net benefits
are greater than the costs. This is the case until period 15 where the costs
would have been higher than the benefits.
12The benefits in “item” are therefore closely related to the pseudo-endowment effect.
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From a welfare perspective the analysis is twofold. Figure 2(d) shows Anna’s
utility from bidding or dropping out, and Anna is clearly trapped in the
auction after period 6 with negative utility. In the short run a bidder is
therefore likely to experience a welfare loss from being trapped to pay more
than initially intended. However, in the long run it is not necessarily bad
for a bidder to get trapped. Only if the bidder is forced to bid and pay more
than the consumption value, she could be worse off than not entering.
Updating the reference point (α):
With no prior intensions to buy the pseudo-endowment effect is caused by
the change in reference point. From that perspective more attachment will
be created in shorter time if the speed of updating the reference, α, is higher.
Yet, with faster updating the bidder will also adjust faster to a lower prob-
ability to win and the pseudo-endowment effect will fade away faster. In
many cases it is therefore not obvious whether fast updating will lead to
higher or lower bids.
For Anna the prior effect is the decisive. If Anna was a slow updater with
α = 0.1 she would increase her attachment to a maximum reference point
probability of qr = 0.065 and her maximum bid would be $112.75. If she on
the other hand was a fast updater with α = 0.5 the corresponding probability
would be qr = 0.171 with a final bid of $153.75.
Beliefs (F ()):
Beliefs about probabilities is another driving factor behind the pseudo-
endowment effect. You could therefore expect the underlying distribution
of prices to have significant effect on the bidding. However, the model turns
out to be relative insensitive to such changes.
To illustrate, consider Bill and Cindy. Bill is a bidder who believes the
price is uniformly distributed between the current price and 200, i.e. the
initially beliefs are U(0, 200). Cindy, on the other hand, is very optimistic
and beliefs in a normal distribution with N(50, 502). Both have the same
preference profiles and enter with the same intentions as Anna, she will thus
act as the benchmark.
The results of their bidding is shown in Figure 3. As expected they all enter
with the same bid. Bill (uniform) has very similar beliefs as Anna despite
the different distribution, and their bidding is very much alike.
Cindy’s optimism boosts her pseudo-endowment effect. However, above a
price of 100 she is equally reluctant to increase her price and once she faces
the 2.5% rule the necessary increase is so painful that she drops out only 2
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periods later than Anna13.
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Figure 3: Distribution and Optimism
Intentions and Pocket Money
Anna, Bill and Cindy have entered the auction with no intentions to buy,
but that is obviously not true for all bidders. Some bidders would naturally
enter with more well thought out intentions. Also, with the huge amount
of auctions on eBay at least a fraction of bidders would enter with another
(unsuccessful) auction participation fresh in mind. A natural modification
is therefore to adjust the reference point to a situation where a bidder enters
with some expectations to buy. For that purpose let me introduce Doug.
Doug recently participated in another similar auction where he thought he
had a 50 pct probability of winning at a price of $100. This is of course a
particularly simple reference point, but it shows the idea.
Another modification is inspired by the fact that people is used to spend
money. In many of the mug experiments the ratio between willingness to
pay (WTP) and certainty equivalent (CE) has generally been much smaller
than the ratio between willingness to accept (WTA) and CE (Novemsky and
Kahneman, 2005a). One interpretation is that people have a certain budget
(pocket money) that they can spend. Again, the natural modification is to
incorporate this budget into the reference point.
The other interpretation could be that people are generally less loss averse
in the money dimension. I will therefore use the approach of Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) where gain-loss utility is dimension specific, i.e. µ′
k−
(0) =
λk and µ
′
k+
(0) = 1. More specifically, consider Emma. Emma enters the
13Note that the effect of α is similar for Cindy than for Anna . A lower speed of updating
will lead to lower attachment and a lower bid in the end. Only if the price is low for a long
time when Cindy is optimistic, a lower speed of update would result in a higher price.
34
auction like Anna with no intension, but Emma has a lover loss aversion
for money of λ1 = 1.5. This corresponds to a ratio between CE and WTP
of (1 + λ1)/(1 + 1) = 1.25. This is slightly higher than the trade of mugs
in Kahneman et al. (1990) and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005a) where
the average is around 1.08. Note that this modification will change the
predictions from Section 3 such that Emma will enter with b1 = 100/(λ1 +
1) = 80. Moreover, Emma will fully defend her reference point up to:
Bt = 100(λ2 + 1)/(λ1 + 1) = 160.
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Figure 4: Intentions at Entry and Pocket Money
In Figure 4 you can see the bidding of Doug, Emma and Anna. Obviously
the modifications have quite an effect on bidding behavior. Both Emma
and Dough reach the absolute maximum of 200. Emma basically follow the
pattern of Anna, only at a higher level, but for Doug the story is a bit
different.
Dough is used to a price of 100 and this will naturally be his initial bid.
This bid does correspond to a higher probability to win than his reference
point. Thus, his reference point probability to win will initially increase.
However, with increasing prices he will also feel trapped to increase his bid
to maintain this probability to win14.
Had his reference point probability been lower when entering, his attachment
would wear out sooner. A lower loss aversion for money, like Emma’s, is
therefore most effective in creating a pseudo-endowment effect. Generally,
this suggests that if you are able to take away the focus on money, for
instance by giving the bidders a feeling of this just being a game, it would be
14Notice also that a slower speed of update would also in this case have two opposite
effects—Less development of attachment, but also a slower decrease. Yet the net-effect in
this specific case would be slightly positive
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the most effective way to get higher bids with Reference-Dependent bidders.
5 Strategies
An important issue for most traders in internet auctions is strategies. Typ-
ically the auctions are designed so that rationally buyers and sellers would
have the incentive to put in their WTP/WTA as the max-bid or min-bid
respectively. However, it is widely accepted that bidders are not rational,
and buyers and sellers do try to take this into account in their strategy. The
question for this section is to consider what traders should do in response
to Reference-Dependent bidders.
Selling
For a seller in a standard internet auction the options are obviously limited.
Normally a seller can change the duration of the auction and the reserve
price. For both of these choices this model has a relatively clear recommen-
dation.
Longer duration will in this model result in a higher number of periods which
could lead to smaller price increases per period. The result would be more
attachment (higher qr) through more periods with low prices early in the
auction and less “painful” bid increases when forced later in the auction.
Longer duration will in this model therefore always lead to higher prices.
The reserve price is in principal an insurance against selling too cheap, but
in practice it is also a tool for maximizing the revenue15. The direct effect
of a reserve price in this framework is very limited since a reserve price
should not effect the probabilities to win the item, qct , with a given bid—
assuming this bid is above the reserve. The only difference is that the
expected payment will be slightly higher. Through the reference point this
could have a slight positive effect when the bidder needs to increase the bid
above her consumption value.
However, this small positive effect of reserve prices does come with a signif-
icant downside. For a bidder with no initial intension to buy the entry bid
is very low. Even low reserve prices can therefore potentially hinder entry
from some Reference-Dependent bidders. Generally, this model therefore
15On most auction sites there are three ways of setting a reserve price: The public
minimum reserve, a secret reserve and shipping costs (This charge does not necessarily have
to be dependent on the reel costs). Although they psychologically might work differently,
e.g. people might simply forget the shipping costs as shown in Hossain and Morgan (2006),
I will focus on the general features from a reserve price.
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suggest the sellers to set as low reserve prices as possible.
Bidding
If you are a rational bidder (at least you think you are) the question could be
when to bid. The widespread use of late bidding could suggest that to be a
dominating strategy (Ockenfels and Roth, 2006; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003).
Early bids or “jump bids” could also be reasonable alternatives. Intuitively
the optimal strategy is dependent on the reference point at entry. Yet, the
initial conclusion must be that a slow price increase like that in Section 4 is
generally dominated by other strategies.
The idea behind late bidding would be to increase the price rapidly at a
level where Reference-Dependent bidders would not be willing to follow. A
slow price increase enables bidders to adjust their reference point to higher
expected payments. A fast price increase would therefore increase the dis-
parity between expected payment in the reference point and the necessary
bid. This is the so-called “comparison effect” of Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
Note that this effect is only relevant above the consumption value as a bid-
der will always increase the bid to this point. “Price jumps” at early stages
will therefore not be successful in shaking off bidders that already entered.
Late bidding do, however, also have a draw-back. Late bidding will lead to
lower prices in early stages of the auction. Thus, bidders with a reference
point of not buying (qr
1
= 0) will create more attachment (higher qr
t
). With
such bidders in the auction a strategy of bidding late is therefore likely to
backfire.
The alternative strategy is to bid early. I that case bidders with no initial
intensions to buy would either create less attachment or even be deterred
from entering. Deterrence could happen if the price is immediately increased
beyond their bid when entering, due to the proxy-bidding procedure. The
negative effect from an early price increase is that bidders will get used to
higher expected payments (as with reserve prices) and the comparison effect
will be reduced later in the auction. Yet, this effect is as mention relatively
weak.
The conclusion must be that, only if you expect most of the bidders to enter
with a reference point of buying, late bidding would be the optimal strategy.
In all other cases the focus most be on depressing the pseudo-endowment
effect by increasing the price as early as possible
Sophistication
A caveat to bidding strategies is if the bidder is aware of her own self-control
problem. With this sophistication a bidder would look for a way to commit
to her initial valuation. One way could be to wait until the last minute to
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enter. Yet, this strategy might not refrain the bidder from changing the
reference point. In fact, as the price will be lower without her entering, she
could potentially get even more optimistic and create a higher qr. Perhaps
sniping tools (like esnipe.com) can act as a commitment device.
Notice again that this sophistication will not necessarily make the bidder
better off. The pseudo-endowment effect is not necessarily unfortunate as
the final bid for a naive bidder might be closer to the underlying consumption
value than the initial WTP. A truly sophisticated bidder would therefore
appreciate the endowment effect and allow herself to increase the bid by
some amount.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Reference-Dependence will often lead to inconsistent behavior. The objec-
tive with this paper is to analyze and predict how this could be the case in
internet auctions. I have therefore developed a dynamic model of bidding
behavior for a semi-rational but loss averse bidder.
Although the model is highly stylized it does give some basic intuition as to
why internet auctions are successful in triggering high bids. If a bidder enters
when the price is low, the focus will be on the opportunity to win the item.
Only later, when the price increases, will the focus shift towards payment.
A loss averse utility maximizer will therefore be caught between losing the
opportunity to win and losing a higher expected payment. If the attachment
to the item is sufficiently high and the price increases sufficiently slowly, the
bidder will be willing to increase the bid to more than the consumption
value.
The underlying change in willingness to pay is supported by the empirical
observations of auctions and bidding behavior. Low reserve prices, for in-
stance, are observed to attract more bidders, create more additional bids at
a given price and finally generate higher prices (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003;
Ariely and Simonsohn, Forthcomming; Ku et al., 2006). Similarly, high ini-
tial prices are found to reduce the number of bidders and, more importantly,
reduce the final price (Bramsen, 2008a).
Although these observations can also be explained by other phenomena (like
a competitive auction fever) there are studies pointing towards the pseudo-
endowment effect. Ariely et al. (2004) show in a laboratory experiment
that having the pseudo-ownership (leading bid) for several bidding rounds
will increase the WTP. Bramsen (2008b) finds the same but in real auction
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data. Moreover, not only “ownership time”, but also “depth of ownership”
(amount between bid and current price) is found to have influence on the
probability to increase the WTP. For these observations the model here
adds that it may not be “ownership time” per se that matters but rather
the necessary time to adjust to a certain probability to win.
There are many simplifying assumptions in the model. The lagged structure
of the reference point is one. The rational approach to beliefs is another.
Naturally, they are subjective and many other specifications could be rea-
sonable. For instance, probabilities are important for a semi-rational bidder,
but this might not be the case for a real bidder. As mentioned it may simply
be the framing and the focusing effect of the auction that triggers loss aver-
sion. Although the results of Bramsen (2008b) suggest that probabilities
do matter, they are exactly the type of questions one must ask in order to
progress towards more operational models of economic behavior.
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APPENDIX
Computation of Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
The very simple example in Section 2 shows how a Reference-Dependence
bidder with the exact preferences structure of Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
will drop out for sufficiently low probabilities or sufficiently high prices.
Figure 5 shows a full computation of a dynamic scenario like that of Anna
in section 4. With no intensions to buy at entry, the bidder will bid 50 like
Anna. However, once entered the dynamics are very different. Basically, the
bidder is not interested in defending the position and once the probability
to win is too low, the bidder decreases the bid (period 7) and drops out in
period 8.
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Figure 5: Bidding with the full model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
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Bid early and get it cheap
– Timing effects in internet auctions∗
Jens-Martin Bramsen
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Abstract
Most internet auction sites, like eBay, use a proxy bidding system where
bidders can put in their maximum bid and let a proxy bidder (a computer) bid
for them. Yet many bidders speculate about how to bid and employ bidding
strategies. This paper examines how the timing of bids can affect the final
price. In a unique data set of 17,000 Scandinavian furniture auctions it turns
out that early price increases, i.e. much early bidding, scare off bidders and
therefore result in lower prices, whereas much late bidding results in higher
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1 Introduction
As a potential bidder in an internet auction one of the questions you are faced
with is when to bid. Obviously, you want to buy the item as cheap as possible,
so perhaps you should use a bidding strategy. On one hand you could bid early,
perhaps to scare off potential bidders, but also risk making a higher price familiar.
On the other hand, you could wait and bid in the last minute to surprise other
bidders. Or maybe you wonder if there, at all, is an effect of the timing of bids.
Since the emergence of internet auction sites like eBay in the late 1990s there have
been numerous articles analyzing this new easy accessible source of auction data.
Most of the early articles focused on testing traditional auction theory, like the
winners curse or revenue equivalence, but bidding behavior has recently received
more attention. Still, it has shown difficult to get significant results as it is very
difficult to infer anything from bidders who follow different strategies and often
have very hidden preferences.
Basically, if the bidders had a fixed willingness to pay (WTP) no effect of a bidding
strategy should be seen. The proxy bidding procedure of e.g. eBay should motivate
bidders to simply put in their WTP sometimes during the auction. However, there
is a widespread tendency for bidders to bid late or even in the last minutes (known
as sniping)1. The question is if this behavior is a response to the specific auction
environment, or if it actually is a successful strategy to buy the item cheaper2.
On eBay there are factors that could justify the widespread use of late bidding. One
reason is the large number of similar goods. A bidder will therefore be inclined to
wait and see which of the items that will end up being the cheapest. Another rea-
son is uncertainty about the item’s (common) value. Thus, a bidder will be most
informed about the value when all other bidders have made their bidding (Bajari
and Hortacsu, 2003). Finally, the hard ending (no extension of the auction) will
motivate bidders to snipe in order to surprise inexperienced or/and incremental3
bidders, who then are not able to respond in time (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002; Ock-
enfels and Roth, 2006).
In this article I analyze 17,076 furniture auctions from Lauritz.com—a Scandina-
vian internet auction site—but unlike eBay, the generic reasons for bidding late are
minimized. If there were no underlying preference dynamics you would therefore
1See e.g. Ockenfels and Roth (2002), Ockenfels and Roth (2006) or the review of Bajari and
Hortacsu (2004).
2The study by Hou (2007) does conclude that late bidding decreases the auction price. However,
it does not take the endogeneity of bidders into account and is only controlling for the final number
of bidders in the auction. As this analysis shows, decreasing the entry of bidders is the whole point
of bidding early. Thus, I am not convinced about the validity of this result.
3Bidders who simply bid the next available bid, not using the proxy bidding feature
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expect no effect of the timing of bids. But that is far from the case.
Auctions with a price jump late in the auction, i.e. a high proportion of late bid-
ding, on average end up with a price significantly higher (up to +17%) than other
auctions. In contrast do auctions with an early jump in price on average end up
with much lower prices (down to -45%) than other auctions. Furthermore, these
results are reproduced in a more general model of each auctions distribution of
price increases.
This article therefore presents new empirical evidence suggesting that there are un-
derlying preference dynamics influencing bidding behavior. As a response, bidders
should in fact bid early to get it cheap.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the auction and the data.
Section 3 discusses how to compare the outcome of auctions with different items.
Section 4 is the initial analysis of timing effects, and in section 5 I am questioning
why, using Instrument Variable Regression. In section 6 I discuss and conclude.
2 The data
Lauritz.com is an auction primarily house based in Denmark, but with activities in
Germany, Norway, and Sweden. All its auctions are internet auctions much like
eBay.com, but there are some important differences. Lauritz.com is not only an
internet site, but also a physical auction house with 18 locations (2007) where the
goods are located and available for inspection during business hours. Potential
bidders therefore have the opportunity to examine the goods thoroughly before
bidding. Moreover, Lauritz.com was a traditional auction house before 2000 and
has kept the tradition of making an expert estimate of the value of the items—the
Valuation. Both of these two features contribute to minimize the information about
quality from other people’s biddings. Thus, at least partly, this takes away the
common value argument for bidding late.
The particular data, to which I have access, are all the modern furniture auctions
from 2005, which amounts to about 37,000 auctions4. More specifically, I have
access to the complete bidding histories, time of start and expiration etc., much
like what is online on any eBay auction just after expiry. The only difference to
the, in principle, public available data on eBay or Lauritz.com is that I also have
the winning bidder’s last bid, and also if the winner returned the item.
Furniture is one of the traditional goods for auction houses, and especially Lau-
4In modern furniture there are two categories: 1) miscellaneous (29%) and 2) tables and
chairs (71%)
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ritz.com has branded itself as reselling classic Scandinavian furniture designs. While
Laurtiz.com was well established on the Danish market in 2005, this was a period
of expansion in Germany and Sweden. I have therefore limited my analysis to the
27,000 Danish auctions. Since this is an analysis of bidding pattern, I have further-
more restricted the data to auctions with at least two bidders (otherwise we would
not observe any bidding pattern). Excluding some extremes, this brings the total
number of auctions down to 17,0765.
The typical procedure is that the seller brings the item to the nearest auction house
where an expert makes a valuation. If the seller is satisfied with the valuation
and the probable sale, Lauritz.com puts it on the internet site with the auction
expiration exactly one week later6. By policy none of the auctions have a reserve
price, but the first available bid is $50 (2005) since this will cover the minimum
fee to Lauritz.com for the seller. Generally, the seller will pay 10% of the reached
auction price (if above $500), and the buyer must pay 20% plus a fixed fee of $57.
During the auction bidders can either bid the next available bid (the current price
plus some predetermined increment of e.g. $20) or use the max-bid service (proxy
bidder) and let the auction site bid for you. In economic terms, bidders can there-
fore bid as if it was a normal first price ascending auction, or as if it was a sort of
second price auction by putting in their maximum bid. This bidding procedure is
very close to the proxy bidding system used on eBay, only the max bids are also
restricted to the increments. However, if a bid arrives within the last 3 minutes the
auction is extended with 3 minutes. This is a so-called soft ending since there will
always be at least 3 minutes of time to react.
Once the auction is over, the winner can pick up the item at the physical auction
house. Due to the Danish Sale of Goods Act there is, however, the rather peculiar
feature that buyers can regret and return the item within two weeks. Although this
feature could potentially have an affect, I do not think it presents a problem for this
analysis8.
The vast majority of the auctions are unique at the time of sale. Surely, there are
5Only auctions with a valuation between $200 and $6,000 are included. Also, there are a few auc-
tions with an error in the time of start that have been altered by mistake and they have subsequently
been removed
6To even out the load, some are put for sale or set for expiration during the evening, but almost
all the auctions have close to one week of duration, and the selected auction all have a duration of 7
days +/- 6 hours
7Since these are Danish auctions all prices are originally in DKK but they have been converted to
USD here, where $1 = DKK 5 (2008)
8If there is uncertainty about WTP, it can potentially make it less costly to bid to much if you
can regret. However, bidders will still have incentive to bid what they believe is their WTP. Further-
more, there are transaction costs and only a limited number do actually use the option (in this data,
6.5%). In comparison to eBay, where a bidder can ignore the purchase perhaps with a black listing
as consequence, bidding on Lauritz.com seems to be more committing.
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some repetitions and classics that are sold in greater numbers, but it is rare to find
competing items at a given time. Thus, bidders do not need to wait to find out
which of the similar items to bid for.
With distinctive items that are professionally valuated and the soft ending, Lau-
ritz.com is a unique internet auction environment where almost all of the practical
and game theoretic arguments for bidding late are absent. From a neoclassical
point of view it should therefore not matter what bidding strategy you choose.
3 Comparing prices between auctions
The exercise in this paper is basically to test the effect of the differences in the tim-
ing of bids amongst otherwise identical auctions in order to answer basic questions
like: should you bid sooner or later? But before approaching the main question of
timing, a more immediate challenge appears; How do you measure a price effect
from 17,076 different items/auctions?
Clearly, it is not meaningful to make a simple comparison between the reached
prices. A dining chair reaching $400 might be a much better price for the seller than
a sofa reaching $1000. The measure I will employ is therefore the price relative to
the valuation made by Laurtiz.com. In other words, if one auctions ends up with a
higher Price/Valuation (P/V) ratio than another it indicates a relatively higher price.
Although valuation is a good proxy for the relative attractiveness of the product, it
is not enough if we want to make a fair comparison between auctions. Some items
are in thin markets and risk being sold at very low prices no matter the auction
development. Some items are more common and popular and therefore more con-
sistently priced. And some products are just worth much more than Laurtitz.com
initially expected and sold at a large premium compared to the valuation. As a
result there is a huge variation in the P/V as Figure 1 shows.
You could argue that we actually do not need to make a fair comparison between
single auctions as we are just interested in the average effect of timing. Yet, there
is most likely a correlation between the relative popularity of an item and the bid-
ding pattern of that auction. You could for instance expect more bidding wars right
before expiration if more bidders are interested in an item. A certain effect of price
pattern could therefore in reality be a result of popularity. To rule out this possibil-
ity, the statistical analysis must somehow control for the underlying popularity on
the market.
The obvious measure for popularity or “attractiveness” is the number of bidders
participating in the auction, and as expected there is a clear and strong relationship
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Figure 1: Number of auctions with a certain P/V ratio
between the number of bidders (N) and the P/V ratio. An extra bidder does for
instance result in a price increase of 6.5% on average9. The major problem is,
however, that the number of bidders cannot be used as a controlling variable as
this variable is endogenous. As an example, consider the effect of a certain reserve
price (sometimes called the minimum price or starting bid). A high reserve price
will most likely reduce the number of bidders, since the bidders with a willingness
to pay below the reserve price naturally will not come forward with a bid. The
direct effect of a higher reserve price is therefore fewer bidders on average.
The auctions here do not have a reserve price, but the same problem will appear
if the price in one auction increases fast compared to other auctions10 . In fact,
as scarring off bidders is one of the possible effects of the bid early strategy, it is
crucial not to ignore this endogeneity problem.
An alternative proxy for popularity that does not have this endogeneity problem is
the initial number of bidders11. To equalize between e.g. morning, I define initial
bidders as the number of bidders the first 24 hours, denoted N24h. Although this
may not be as good a proxy for market interest as the total number of bidders, it
still does hint at the underlying interest amongst potential costumers12 . Also, it
does seem to be a reasonable proxy as the correlation between N24h and N is 0.69.
Thus, N24hi will be used as a control for “attractiveness” for auction i.
To conclude, an auction with a high price is defined as an auction with a relative
9The result of a simple least squared regression with P/V as a response of the Number of bidders
10Assuming that bidding is distributed during the auction week.
11Alternatively, it could also be the number of bids or/and the initial price increase, but this might
say more about bidding strategies than of underlying interest.
12You could argue that a rapid price increase will also effect entry within the 24 hours, but I do not
think it is very decisive.
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high Price/Valuation ratio compared to other auctions with, in principle: 1) the
same N24h), 2) the same Valuation (V ) and 3) the same values for other controls
denoted X , like the time of day and the day of week. More precisely, the analysis
in this paper will be based on least squared regression with a structure of Equation
(1).
Pi/Vi = f (PricePatterni)+g(N24hi , Vi, Xi)+ εi
where εi are i.i.d.
(1)
The exact specification of the controls, g(), can be found in Appendix A. Moreover
g() will stay unchanged throughout, whereas the effect of price patterns, material-
ized in the function f (), will be separated and analyzed.
4 Timing effects
The 17,076 auctions contain roughly 353,000 unique bids from 30,600 individual
bidders. The objective here is to convert this micro-level data into some standard-
ized testable characteristics at the auction (macro) level in order to link auction-
level price effects to micro-level bidding. Hence, the idea is to define and discuss
the effect of the function f () from equation (1).
4.1 Price Jumps
As mentioned, one could have the strategy to scare off other bidders by driving
up the price early, i.e. a so-called jump bid (if successful). The other strategy of
particular interest is that of late bidding. A straightforward way of categorizing
auctions with these strategies is to look for price jumps early and late in the auc-
tion. Yet, an absolute jump in the price does not necessarily reveal anything about
a strategy. A price increase of $100 could be a large increase for something inex-
pensive, but a small increase for something expensive. Of course, you could be a
bit more sophisticated and define a jump as a certain percentage of the valuation,
but as the valuation is imperfect the basic problem remains.
What is relevant is the distribution of the actual price increases. A bidder deciding
on a strategy will basically either bid now or wait. Thus, if much of the total price
increase happens early in the auction some key bidders must actively have chosen
to bid early rather than to wait13. On the other hand, if key bidders wait and use
late bidding a large proportion of the total price increase must happen during the
13Recall that this is like a second price auction meaning that you are dependent on another bidder
to bid up the price. Yet a price jump early will still be an indication of some bidders deciding to bid
early. Also, as a bidder taking the bid early strategy this might be what you hope for.
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last hours or even minutes. Until that point the price will therefore be relatively
low compared to the final price. The relevant measure of strategies must therefore
be price jumps relative to the entire price increase. The first categorizations of
price patterns (and thus the underlying bidding strategies) is a number of binary
variables defined as:
jumpi tsmall =
{
1, if the price increase for auction i at time t is 40% - 50% of the total
0, else
jumpi t large =
{
1, if the price increase for auction i at time t is >50% of the total
0, else
These jumps are defined for t = {1,2, ...,9}, where
t = 1 is defined as Day 1 (the first 24 hours)
t = 2 is defined as Day 2 (24h to 48h)
...
t = 6 is Day 6 until 2.a.m.
t = 7 is Day 7 until 3 hours before the end
t = 8 is -3 hours until -15 minutes (-3h)
t = 9 is the last 15 minutes (-15min)
I did not take into account any of the 3 minutes extensions of the soft ending which
implies that if an auction was extended 2 x 3 minutes, t = 9 will be the last 9 min-
utes of the ordinary auction time and 6 minutes of extended time. The size of jumps
and the time intervals are of course rather arbitrary, but chosen to get a reasonable
number of auctions within each group without loosing the link to the strategies.
The exact proportion of auctions in each group is specified in Appendix A, but the
overall levels are:
34.4% does not have any jumps
25.3% has a small jump
35.2% has a large jump
2.7% has two small jumps
2.3% has a small and a large jump.
It turns out that the effect of such price jumps is surprisingly clear and consistent.
Figure 2 shows the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from regressing the
Price/Valuation ratio against these binary jump variables, i.e. a least squares re-
gression similar to that of Equation (1). The exact specification and results can be
seen in Appendix A.3.
Early jumps have a large and significant negative effect on the final price, large and
early jumps having the largest negative effect. Yet, on the last day this effect is
reversed. If the jump happens within the last 3 hours there is a significant positive
effect on prices. Hence, if you are a bidder this result suggests that you should bid
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Figure 2: Average effect on P/V from price jumps
as early as possible and try to make the price jump.
4.2 Price Increase Distributions
While the price jumps and the time intervals may seem arbitrary, another approach
is to look directly at the distribution of price increases. Again, we have in principle
17,076 different distributions, but many do share some characteristics. Fitting a
relative simple parametric function is therefore a feasible approach. In particular,
it seems reasonable to look among probability distribution functions as probability
distributions and price increase distribution would naturally share some character-
istics (Price start in zero and end up at 100% of the final price—much like a cumu-
lative probability distribution). The challenge is to find a probability distribution
function which is both flexible and possible to interpret with respect to strategies.
Among the hyperlinks at Lauritz.com’s front page there is one for “New items”
and one for “Last Chance”. This, together with the bid early or late strategies,
could lead to a over-representation of bids the first and last day, and if you look
further into the data this is in fact the case. 19% of all the unique bids arrive the
first day and 46% the last day14. As a consequence, the potential density function
needs to be able to take a sort of U-shape. Still, the bidding can of course also
be characterized by more complex patterns. The potential density function must
therefore also be able to take other shapes like an inverted U.
One density function which can contain most such bidding patterns in a simple
14Unique bids defined as a bidder manually making a bid no matter if it is a max-bid or just an
increment.
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manner is the Beta distribution function. Furthermore, the two parameters (α and
β) of the Beta distribution are easy to interpret in relation to the bid early or late
strategies. To illustrate, consider the different specifications of a Beta probability
density function in Figure 3. α is directly linked to the proportion of early price
increases, and β to the late price increases. The lower the parameters, the higher
the proportion of price increases. When α = β = 1 it is a uniform distribution and
if α < 1 and β < 1, the distribution has a U-shape with a high proportion of price
increases early and late.
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Figure 3: Beta distributions
It is relatively simple to estimate α and β for every auction as this can be done from
the empirical mean and variance with the method-of-moments (see Appendix A.2).
The result of this estimation is that 60.6% of the auctions have estimates of α and
β where they both are below 1, and only 19.6% where they both are above. Thus,
as expected most auctions are estimated to have U-shape distributions of bidding.
Figure 4 shows the estimated effects of αˆ and ˆβ on the Price/Valuation ratio. They
are found in a regression similar to that of section 4.1, but where the function f ()
from Equation (1) is defined as:
f () = a11 · ln(αˆi)+a12 · ln(αˆi)2 +a21 · ln( ˆβi)+a22 · ln( ˆβi)2
The figure shows a clear negative effect of higher ˆβ and a clear positive effect
of higher αˆ. Furthermore, the estimated parameters, a11,a12,a21,a22 are highly
significant which also can be seen from the 95% confidence intervals shown with
the broken lines (very close to the estimate). In fact, this model with only two
variables describing the price pattern, seems to be a much better model than that in
section 4.1, as it increases the adjusted R2 with 0.08 to 0.34. The full results of the
regression can be found in Appendix A.3.
The interpretation of this result is a bit more tricky than the jumps. Higher αˆ means
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Figure 4: Effect on P/V of estimated α and β
a lower proportion of price increases in the beginning of auction. In other words,
the more price increases in the beginning (lower αˆ), the lower the average prices.
For ˆβ the effect is the opposite; The higher the proportion of price increases late in
the auction (lower ˆβ), the higher the average price. To further quantify, consider
the estimated effects of the lower (Q1) and upper quartile (Q1) for αˆ and ˆβ in Table
115. Basically, both the sign and the magnitude supports the effects found from
price jumps.
αˆ ˆβ
Q1 -31% +38%
Q3 +8% +1%
Table 1: Quantifying the effect of αˆ and ˆβ
5 Instrumental Variable Regression
One possible explanation for these results is that early price increase scare off bid-
ders. As argued, this was one of the reasons for using N24h instead of total N to
control for popularity. To dig a little deeper, it is therefore natural to look at the
indirect effect which price jumps have on total N. This is easily done by replacing
P/V with N as the dependent variable in the first regression of section 4.1. The
result of this OLS regression can be found in Appendix B, but the main results are
shown in Figure 5.
15The values for these quartiles are: Qαˆ1 = 0.28, Qαˆ3 = 1.49, Q
ˆβ
1 = 0.17, and Q
ˆβ
3 = 0.93
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As shown, all jumps have a negative effect on the total number of bidders entering
the auction. Also, large and early jumps are more efficient to reduce entry. How-
ever, this is as expected as a higher price naturally would deter some bidders from
entering. The question is if this effect is powerful enough to be the driving factor.
To answer this question, the last step must be to isolate the direct effect of price
jumps on prices. In other words, if the indirect effect of reduced entry is taken into
account, what is the remaining effect of jumps on prices?
Such an analysis can be performed as Instrumental Variable (IV) regression using
a two stage least square procedure. The first step in this procedure is to predict
total N on the basis of jumps, N24h and other controls. This is the regression from
above. This predicted N is then used as exogenous variable in the next regression
where P/V is the dependent variable.
In theory, the two regression must be estimated simultaneously as the error terms
will be correlated16 . Traditionally, this procedure is therefore represented as a sys-
tems of equations as shown in Equation (2), where N24h is said to be the instrument
for N. {
Pi/Vi = f ( jumpsi)+g(Ni, Vi, zi)+ εi
Ni = f ( jumpsi)+g(N24hi , Vi, zi)+νi
(2)
The result of this IV regression shows that the direct (intrinsic) effects of jumps on
prices are generally positive as shown in Figure 617. This is more the case the larger
16In practice they are however estimated in a two step procedure, but where the error terms are
adjusted subsequently
17The full result can be found in Appendix C.
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and later the jumps are. In itself a price jump will therefore most likely contribute
to higher prices perhaps as a sort of momentum effect in the short run.
To conclude, price jumps have a positive intrinsic effect, but because they also
scare off bidders this effect can be reversed. The surprising part is, however, that
the deterrence effect is often so strong that the positive intrinsic effect is likely
to be reversed. Naturally this is more the case the sooner the price jump, but the
deterrence effect is in fact so strong that up until the last 3 hours, it will dominate
on average.
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Figure 6: Intrinsic effect of price jumps (IV regression)
This analysis can similarly be performed with the estimated parameters from the
Beta distribution of section 4.2. Instead of analyzing the effect of αˆ and ˆβ on
the total number of bidders, I will go directly to the Instrumental variable (IV)
regression. The result of this (IV) regression can be found in Figure 718. Here the
effect of IV estimates are shown on top of the estimates from section 4.2. Clearly,
this shows that removing the deterrence effect on bidders does moderate the effect
of early and late bidding (low αˆ and ˆβ), but the effect is not reversed as in the case
of jumps.
The overall conclusion is that early price increases on average always will scare
off bidders. Price jumps may scare off more bidders, but will perhaps also lead
to a momentum effect and have a positive intrinsic effect on the price. But since
a bidder cannot control how other bidders bid up the price, the important conclu-
sion is that an early bid, whether this leads to slow or fast early price increases,
unambiguously is the best strategy.
The advice for later entry is on the other hand always to try to jump the price. Late
18The full result can be found in in Appendix C
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Figure 7: Effect on P/V (IV estimation)
price increase will no matter the size intrinsically lead to higher prices, perhaps
because the relative low price will always attract potential bidders19. Yet a price
jump will on average also later on prevent some of these potential late bidders
from entering, and the net effect on the final price from late jumps is therefore less
positive than a more slow, but also late price increases.
6 Discussion
The analysis in this article suggests that the timing of bids does matter, and unlike
the prototypical behavior it seems to be a dominating strategy to bid sooner rather
than later. Although both approaches (jumps and the Beta distributions) might
seem a little artificial, I do believe that the combination makes a strong argument.
There is, however, one possible critique; the potential endogeneity of (N24h). Prin-
cipally, both jumps day 1 and αˆ do influence N24h in the same way that the general
price pattern makes total N endogenous. Yet, if we follow this logic, the effect of a
price increase on day 1 must in fact be even more negative, had the N24h not been
negatively influenced by that early price increase. Hence, this argument will only
make the conclusion stronger.
Generally, you could also have doubts about the effectiveness of the controlling
variables. In principal there could still be some unobserved variables, e.g. lower
quality, which is the real explanation behind the lower price of auctions with early
19Thus also called sniping bate
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price increases. However, auctions with much of the price increase early do gener-
ally have more initial bidders than the average auction. Thus, this does not indicate
lower quality, rather the opposite, so perhaps the deterrence effect is even stronger
than estimated here. Again, this could make the conclusion stronger rather than
weaker.
In a broader perspective these results basically tell us that the entry threshold is
often different from the final bid. Hence bidders must change their willingness
to pay during the auction. That is in itself not too surprising as other analysis on
eBay data have had the same insinuation20 . This analysis does, however, give a
little more insight into how this change in preference is triggered. It seems to be
coursed by either the relative low price or the momentum in the price increase. Let
me take each case separately.
The positive intrinsic effect of price jumps cf. Figure 6 could suggest some mo-
mentum in the bidding. Once the price starts to increase, bidders might get excited
and competitive. Ariely and Simonsohn (Forthcomming) e.g. show that auctions
with a low reserve, and hence many bidders/bids, have a higher probability of
receiving more bids than similar auctions with a higher reserve price and fewer
bidders/bids.
This kind of competitive behavior might even turn into “auction fever” where bid-
ders get carried away by the idea of winning, see e.g. Lee and Malmendier (2006)
or Ariely and Simonsen (2003). However, auctions with late jumps (auctions with
a high likelihood of “auction fever”) have a lower probability of return21. Thus,
bidders who won the item in a very competitive auction will less often take ad-
vantage of the 14 days right to return as provided by the auction house. “Auction
fever” does therefore not seem to be a dominating explanation.
The other explanation is that bidders seem to be attracted by the “good deal” and
once they have entered they get caught. This could therefore be an example of
the so-called pseudo- or quasi-endowment effect as suggested by e.g. Ariely et al.
(2004) and Wolf et al. (2005). Basically, the idea is that bidders get used to the
idea of buying and will therefore be willing to increase their bids in order to avoid
the loss of this pseudo-endowment.
The results here suggest that this effect is especially pronounced when prices are
relative low and bidders get overoptimistic about their possibility to win. In other
words, it is when bidders expect to win with a high probability that they feel owner-
ship and get caught in the auction. This analysis does in fact suggests that bidders
either create this feeling of ownership very fast or create it before entering e.g. dur-
20see e.g. Ariely et al. (2004), Ariely and Simonsohn (Forthcomming), Ku et al. (2005), or Wolf
et al. (2005).
21See the logit model of return in Appendix D
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ing observation. However, these conclusion are still on a very speculative level so
this is an obvious area for further research.
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APPENDIX
A Basic regressions behind Timing Effects
The main results of this paper, i.e. the effects on the Price/Valuation (P/V) ratio
of section 4, is based on a simple Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression. As
discussed in section 3, the controlling variables is of great importance to the relia-
bility of the result. I have therefore used all available controls without considering
significance level. With the large amount of degrees of freedom there is no need to
reduce the model as much as possible. The controlling variables are therefore:
Initial bidders the first 24 hours (N24h) As discussed, the most important con-
trolling variable in the basic regression is the initial bidders as a proxy for
underlying interest. Besides a linear term there is also a quadratic and a cubic
term as they are also significant.
Valuation Even though valuation is also used to define the dependent variable
(P/V), valuation is also in itself an important explanatory variable. Further-
more, the interaction between Valuation and N24h is also significant.
Hour Auctions finish throughout the day from 8 a.m. to midnight. As some hours
may be more successful than others, I therefore us this as a control.
Weekday Similarly auctions are sold throughout the week although very few on
Sundays.
Month Wintertime is more busy and, as it turns out, more successful in getting
higher prices.
Category As mentioned, 71% of the auctions are in the “Table and chairs” and
29% are in the “miscellaneous” group. I also use these categories as controls.
A.1 Jumps
The first regression uses price jumps as dummy variables as a categorization of the
price structure. In section 4.1 includes the reasoning and definition of these jumps.
The exact sizes of the jumps are of course a bit arbitrary, but they are principal
chosen to get a even distribution of the auctions. The percentage of auctions with
a certain jump is listed in Table 1.
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 -3h -15min
Small jumps 6.5% 2.0% 1.9% 1.6% 1.7% 4.8% 4.7% 5.3% 2.2%
Large jumps 8.5% 2.2% 2.6% 2.2% 2.7% 8.1% 7.1% 5.0% 1.4%
Table 2: Auctions with jumps59
A.2 The Beta distribution
The second regression utilizes the Beta distribution to describe the price pattern.
The probability density function of the beta distribution is defined as:
f (x;α,β) = x
α−1(1− x)β−1
∫ 1
0 u
α−1(1−u)β−1 du
I use the method-of-moments estimates of the two parameters in the beta distribu-
tion. In other words αˆ and ˆβ are calculated from the empirical mean, x¯, and the
empirical variance, v, as:
αˆ = x¯
(
x¯(1−x¯)
v
−1
)
and ˆβ = (1− x¯)
(
x¯(1−x¯)
v
−1
)
A.3 Results
Regression 1: Regression 2:
Jumps Beta distribution
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 0.8348 0.1243 *** 0.6455 0.1176 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 -0.3507 0.0126 *** - -
jump2 0.4-0.5 -0.0883 0.0213 *** - -
jump3 0.4-0.5 -0.0725 0.0221 ** - -
jump4 0.4-0.5 -0.1047 0.0237 *** - -
jump5 0.4-0.5 -0.0653 0.0232 ** - -
jump6 0.4-0.5 -0.0465 0.0142 ** - -
jump7 0.4-0.5 -0.0079 0.0144 - -
jump3h 0.4-0.5 0.1134 0.0137 *** - -
jump15min 0.4-0.5 0.1038 0.0206 *** - -
jump1 >0.5 -0.4546 0.0114 *** - -
jump2 >0.5 -0.2131 0.0209 *** - -
jump3 >0.5 -0.1955 0.0194 *** - -
jump4 >0.5 -0.1563 0.0207 *** - -
jump5 >0.5 -0.1795 0.0192 *** - -
jump6 >0.5 -0.1092 0.012 *** - -
jump7 >0.5 -0.0637 0.0125 *** - -
jump3h >0.5 0.1705 0.0144 *** - -
jump15min >0.5 0.0849 0.0255 *** - -
a11 : ln(αˆ) - - 0.2070 0.0035 ***
a12 : ln(αˆ)2 - - -0.0264 0.0005 ***
a21 : ln( ˆβ) - - -0.1753 0.0032 ***
a22 : ln( ˆβ)2 - - 0.0232 0.0007 ***
Valuation -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 ***
N24h 0.2146 0.0074 *** 0.2820 0.0079 ***
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
(N24h)2 -0.0257 0.0023 *** -0.0376 0.0024 ***
(N24h)3 0.0011 0.0002 *** 0.0016 0.0002 ***
Valuation*N24h 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ***
factor(Category)Tables and chairs 0.0021 0.0066 0.0184 0.0062 **
factor(Month)2 0.0038 0.0167 0.0028 0.0158
factor(Month)3 -0.0599 0.0171 *** -0.0568 0.0162 ***
factor(Month)4 -0.0797 0.0167 *** -0.0761 0.0158 ***
factor(Month)5 -0.0804 0.0163 *** -0.0796 0.0154 ***
factor(Month)6 -0.0948 0.0162 *** -0.0957 0.0153 ***
factor(Month)7 -0.0970 0.0183 *** -0.1061 0.0173 ***
factor(Month)8 -0.0750 0.0163 *** -0.0728 0.0154 ***
factor(Month)9 -0.1055 0.0157 *** -0.1118 0.0149 ***
factor(Month)10 -0.0766 0.0165 *** -0.0808 0.0156 ***
factor(Month)11 -0.0962 0.0162 *** -0.0990 0.0153 ***
factor(Month)12 -0.0860 0.0170 *** -0.0919 0.0160 ***
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0097 0.0091 -0.0151 0.0086 .
factor(Ends weekday)3 -0.0084 0.0092 -0.0202 0.0087 *
factor(Ends weekday)4 -0.0116 0.0097 -0.0223 0.0092 *
factor(Ends weekday)5 0.0002 0.0097 -0.0133 0.0092
factor(Ends weekday)6 -0.0626 0.0449 -0.0601 0.0426
factor(Ends weekday)7 0.0062 0.1947 -0.0234 0.1844
factor(Time of day)8 -0.0866 0.1264 -0.0957 0.1197
factor(Time of day)9 -0.0706 0.1242 -0.0794 0.1176
factor(Time of day)10 -0.0446 0.1238 -0.0588 0.1172
factor(Time of day)11 -0.0428 0.1236 -0.0443 0.1170
factor(Time of day)12 -0.0422 0.1235 -0.0444 0.1169
factor(Time of day)13 -0.0432 0.1234 -0.0519 0.1168
factor(Time of day)14 -0.0472 0.1233 -0.0601 0.1168
factor(Time of day)15 -0.0574 0.1233 -0.0646 0.1168
factor(Time of day)16 -0.0551 0.1235 -0.0690 0.1170
factor(Time of day)17 -0.0314 0.1237 -0.0488 0.1172
factor(Time of day)18 -0.0395 0.1286 -0.0579 0.1218
factor(Time of day)19 -0.0223 0.1590 -0.1347 0.1505
factor(Time of day)20 -0.1654 0.1615 -0.2073 0.1529
factor(Time of day)22 -0.1609 0.4079 -0.0568 0.3865
factor(Time of day)23 -0.1765 0.1615 -0.1324 0.1529
Residual standard error: 0.3886 Residual standard error: 0.3681
Significant codes: on 17019 degrees of freedom on 17033 degrees of freedom
*** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 Adjusted R2: 0.2642 Adjusted R2: 0.3396
Table 2: Effects on the Price/Valuation ratio
B Effect of jumps on total N
A first step to find an underlying explanation is to find the effect of jumps on the
total number of bidders. Compared to the first regression of Table 2, the depending
variable, P/V, is therefore simply replaced with the total number of bidders, N. The
results of this regression is listed in Table 4 below:
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Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 4.6810 0.5927 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 -1.7620 0.0600 ***
jump2 0.4-0.5 -0.9605 0.1017 ***
jump3 0.4-0.5 -1.0100 0.1054 ***
jump4 0.4-0.5 -1.0920 0.1130 ***
jump5 0.4-0.5 -1.0510 0.1105 ***
jump6 0.4-0.5 -0.6581 0.0676 ***
jump7 0.4-0.5 -0.4633 0.0686 ***
jump3h 0.4-0.5 -0.2088 0.0654 **
jump15min 0.4-0.5 -0.4712 0.0982 ***
jump1 >0.5 -2.9020 0.0546 ***
jump2 >0.5 -2.0120 0.0995 ***
jump3 >0.5 -2.1370 0.0925 ***
jump4 >0.5 -2.0480 0.0986 ***
jump5 >0.5 -2.1140 0.0915 ***
jump6 >0.5 -1.6440 0.0571 ***
jump7 >0.5 -1.3470 0.0595 ***
jump3h >0.5 -1.0120 0.0688 ***
jump15min >0.5 -1.1990 0.1215 ***
Valuation 0.0005 0.0000 ***
N24h 1.0830 0.0352 ***
(N24h)2 0.0267 0.0110 *
(N24h)3 0.0004 0.0009
Valuation*N24h -0.0001 0.0000 ***
factor(Category)Tables and chairs 0.2421 0.0314 ***
factor(Month)2 -0.0198 0.0794
factor(Month)3 -0.1365 0.0814
factor(Month)4 -0.2971 0.0796 ***
factor(Month)5 -0.3675 0.0776 ***
factor(Month)6 -0.4599 0.0771 ***
factor(Month)7 -0.2808 0.0873 **
factor(Month)8 -0.3541 0.0779 ***
factor(Month)9 -0.2022 0.0749 **
factor(Month)10 0.0735 0.0787
factor(Month)11 -0.0624 0.0773
factor(Month)12 -0.0278 0.0808
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0342 0.0433
factor(Ends weekday)3 -0.0804 0.0436
factor(Ends weekday)4 -0.1110 0.0461 *
factor(Ends weekday)5 0.0462 0.0463
factor(Ends weekday)6 0.0990 0.2143
factor(Ends weekday)7 1.4190 0.9285
factor(Time of day)8 -0.2703 0.6026
factor(Time of day)9 -0.2400 0.5924
factor(Time of day)10 -0.0556 0.5902
factor(Time of day)11 -0.1374 0.5895
factor(Time of day)12 -0.1883 0.5888
factor(Time of day)13 -0.2218 0.5883
factor(Time of day)14 -0.2795 0.5881
factor(Time of day)15 -0.4160 0.5883
factor(Time of day)16 -0.4533 0.5891
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error
factor(Time of day)17 -0.3317 0.5902
factor(Time of day)18 -0.1886 0.6133
factor(Time of day)19 -0.2950 0.7582
factor(Time of day)20 -1.4090 0.7701
factor(Time of day)22 0.4511 1.9450
factor(Time of day)23 -0.4437 0.7700
Residual standard error: 1.853 on 17019 degrees of freedom, Adjusted R2: 0.6357
Significant codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05
Table 3: Effect on final number of bidders
C Instrumental Variable Regression
As described in section 5, Instrumental Variable (IV) Regression can isolate the
direct effects of the price pattern, i.e. disregard the indirect effect on the entry
of new bidders and only see the direct effect on prices. The results of this IV
regression, i.e. the direct effect on P/V, is listed in Table 5 below using both jumps
and the Beta distribution to describe the price pattern.
IV Regression: IV Regression:
Jumps Beta distribution
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept -0.4160 0.1520 ** -0.6961 0.1692 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 -0.1120 0.0136 *** - -
jump2 0.4-0.5 0.0391 0.0233 - -
jump3 0.4-0.5 0.0764 0.0242 ** - -
jump4 0.4-0.5 0.0587 0.0260 * - -
jump5 0.4-0.5 0.0891 0.0254 *** - -
jump6 0.4-0.5 0.0544 0.0156 *** - -
jump7 0.4-0.5 0.0629 0.0157 *** - -
jump3h 0.4-0.5 0.1530 0.0149 *** - -
jump15min 0.4-0.5 0.1750 0.0223 *** - -
jump1 >0.5 0.0147 0.0153 - -
jump2 >0.5 0.1500 0.0256 *** - -
jump3 >0.5 0.1850 0.0244 *** - -
jump4 >0.5 0.2060 0.0252 *** - -
jump5 >0.5 0.2110 0.0246 *** - -
jump6 >0.5 0.1910 0.0167 *** - -
jump7 >0.5 0.1770 0.0158 *** - -
jump3h >0.5 0.3610 0.0171 *** - -
jump15min >0.5 0.2840 0.0282 *** - -
a11 : ln(αˆ) - - 0.0948 0.0035 ***
a12 : ln(αˆ)2 - - -0.0092 0.0007 ***
a21 : ln( ˆβ) - - -0.0266 0.0049 ***
a22 : ln( ˆβ)2 - - 0.0139 0.0009 ***
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Valuation -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0003 0.0000 ***
N24h 0.4280 0.0309 *** 0.5809 0.0410 ***
(N24h)2 -0.0303 0.0036 *** -0.0460 0.0047 ***
(N24h)3 0.0006 0.0001 *** 0.0010 0.0002 ***
Valuation*N24h 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ***
factor(Category)Tables and chairs -0.0282 0.0072 *** -0.0349 0.0077 ***
factor(Month)2 0.0049 0.0179 0.0224 0.0192
factor(Month)3 -0.0424 0.0184 * -0.0212 0.0197
factor(Month)4 -0.0344 0.0180 -0.0073 0.0193
factor(Month)5 -0.0301 0.0176 0.0036 0.0188
factor(Month)6 -0.0236 0.0175 0.0168 0.0188
factor(Month)7 -0.0464 0.0198 * -0.0144 0.0212
factor(Month)8 -0.0290 0.0176 0.0025 0.0189
factor(Month)9 -0.0700 0.0170 *** -0.0361 0.0182 *
factor(Month)10 -0.0808 0.0178 *** -0.0571 0.0190 **
factor(Month)11 -0.0799 0.0174 *** -0.0467 0.0187 *
factor(Month)12 -0.0759 0.0182 *** -0.0376 0.0196
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0023 0.0098 0.0022 0.0105
factor(Ends weekday)3 0.0029 0.0099 0.0100 0.0106
factor(Ends weekday)4 0.0008 0.0104 0.0053 0.0111
factor(Ends weekday)5 -0.0052 0.0104 -0.0038 0.0112
factor(Ends weekday)6 -0.0692 0.0484 -0.1104 0.0517
factor(Ends weekday)7 -0.2970 0.2100 -0.3787 0.2240
factor(Time of day)8 -0.0735 0.1360 -0.0633 0.1453
factor(Time of day)9 -0.0684 0.1340 -0.0852 0.1429
factor(Time of day)10 -0.0702 0.1330 -0.0953 0.1424
factor(Time of day)11 -0.0576 0.1330 -0.0770 0.1422
factor(Time of day)12 -0.0536 0.1330 -0.0761 0.1421
factor(Time of day)13 -0.0495 0.1330 -0.0646 0.1419
factor(Time of day)14 -0.0404 0.1330 -0.0548 0.1418
factor(Time of day)15 -0.0340 0.1330 -0.0407 0.1419
factor(Time of day)16 -0.0170 0.1330 -0.0245 0.1421
factor(Time of day)17 -0.0283 0.1330 -0.0363 0.1423
factor(Time of day)18 -0.0267 0.1390 -0.0261 0.1479
factor(Time of day)19 -0.0090 0.1710 -0.0544 0.1830
factor(Time of day)20 0.0526 0.1740 0.0733 0.1858
factor(Time of day)22 -0.1060 0.4390 -0.0706 0.4698
factor(Time of day)23 -0.1600 0.1740 -0.1911 0.1857
Significant codes: Residual standard error: 0.4182 Residual standard error: 0.4471
*** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 on 17019 degrees of freedom on 17033 degrees of freedom
Table 4: Instrumental Variable Regressions
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D Returned
The Danish Sale of Goods Act specifies 14 days of right to return for all trade on
the internet with private consumers. There has been some discussion on whether
internet auctions like Lauritz.com are included in this, but for now they are. Hence,
all private winners have two weeks to regret their purchase.
Naturally, Laurtiz.com is trying to discourage the use of this right to return as this
may encourage reckless or perhaps even fake bidding. Also, returned items have
to be put on auction again. Although this right is described on the auctions site, it
may not be clear to all users. Furthermore, buyers must in principal pay for the item
within 3 days while you will only get your money back within a 30 days period.
Here, I have modeled the actual return as logit regression in order to find the factors
that have a positive or negative influence on the probability to return. The result of
this logit regression is listed in Table 6 below.
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -5.8920 1.1840 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 0.0095 0.1375
jump2 0.4-0.5 0.6969 0.1887 ***
jump3 0.4-0.5 -0.0049 0.2441
jump4 0.4-0.5 0.1401 0.2454
jump5 0.4-0.5 0.1495 0.2520
jump6 0.4-0.5 -0.0290 0.1602
jump7 0.4-0.5 -0.3257 0.1825 .
jump3h 0.4-0.5 -0.0635 0.1496
jump15min 0.4-0.5 -0.3136 0.2546
jump1 >0.5 0.2330 0.1221 .
jump2 >0.5 0.2777 0.2134
jump3 >0.5 0.5374 0.1861 **
jump4 >0.5 0.4896 0.2053 *
jump5 >0.5 0.4939 0.1880 **
jump6 >0.5 0.1646 0.1279
jump7 >0.5 0.2457 0.1295 .
jump3h >0.5 0.1449 0.1490
jump15min >0.5 -0.0558 0.2941
Valuation 0.0001 0.0000 ***
N 0.0765 0.0178 ***
Valuation*N 0.0000 0.0000 **
factor(Category)Tables and chairs -0.0184 0.0702
factor(Month)2 -1.8220 1.1190
factor(Month)3 1.6130 0.5380 **
factor(Month)4 2.3740 0.5181 ***
factor(Month)5 2.7420 0.5120 ***
factor(Month)6 2.9270 0.5104 ***
factor(Month)7 3.0530 0.5158 ***
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Estimate Std. Error
factor(Month)8 3.0070 0.5102 ***
factor(Month)9 3.1580 0.5077 ***
factor(Month)10 3.2130 0.5093 ***
factor(Month)11 3.0860 0.5094 ***
factor(Month)12 3.2170 0.5104 ***
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0414 0.0978
factor(Ends weekday)3 -0.0153 0.0975
factor(Ends weekday)4 0.0473 0.1003
factor(Ends weekday)5 0.0392 0.1006
factor(Ends weekday)6 -0.0019 0.4747
factor(Ends weekday)7 -10.0600 155.2000
factor(Time of day)8 -0.1953 1.1020
factor(Time of day)9 0.1373 1.0710
factor(Time of day)10 -0.1845 1.0670
factor(Time of day)11 -0.1160 1.0650
factor(Time of day)12 -0.1840 1.0630
factor(Time of day)13 -0.1515 1.0620
factor(Time of day)14 -0.4162 1.0620
factor(Time of day)15 -0.3470 1.0620
factor(Time of day)16 -0.3732 1.0650
factor(Time of day)17 -0.6352 1.0700
factor(Time of day)18 0.0914 1.1180
factor(Time of day)19 -0.0796 1.4990
factor(Time of day)20 -0.6189 1.5010
factor(Time of day)22 14.8000 324.7000
factor(Time of day)23 -0.3891 1.4880
Residual deviance: 7696.9 on 17021 degrees of freedom
Significant codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05
Table 5: The logit regression for return
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Rebidding?
A pseudo-endowment effect in internet auctions∗
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Abstract
Although bidders in an internet auction do not obtain the actual
ownership of the item during the auction, they still act according to
an endowment effect. In a unique data set of 17,000 Danish furniture
auctions I find that having the leading bid, both in terms of time and
dollars, will affect the bidders probability to rebid if outbid. Thus,
expectations to own, i.e. “pseudo-endowment”, seem to affect bidders’
willingness to pay in a relative fast and straightforward manor. Gener-
ally, these data therefore support that the reference point, from which
we measure losses and gains, is closely related to expectations.
Keywords: Internet auctions, Reference-Dependent Preferences, Endow-
ment Effect, Bidding behavior, eBay, WTP, Reference Point.
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1 Introduction
Bidding behavior in real auctions can often from an economist’s point of
view look mysterious. The rational equilibrium strategy of game theory
looks nothing like the strategy and behavior that is often observed. There
are many examples of how bidders “get caught” in the game and end up
paying too much. Especially in internet auctions, like eBay, this has been
documented (Ariely and Simonsen, 2003; Lee and Malmendier, 2006). At
first glance you might simply conclude that bidders must have some kind
of “auction fever”. However, developments in Behavioral Economics could
perhaps assists us when trying to understand some of this behavior.
One possible explanation is based on the endowment effect originally sug-
gested by Thaler (1980). Once you own an item, selling it will feel like a
loss whereas the money you receive in return is viewed as a gain. Thus,
as people generally dislike losses considerably more than they like the same
sized gains, the item will often be worth more to you when selling it as op-
posed to buying it. This was nicely demonstrated by Kahneman et al. (1990)
where randomly distributed mugs had an average selling price of approx. $7
whereas the corresponding buying price was approximately $3.
Bidders do not obtain the actual ownership of the item during an auction.
Still, they can get a feeling of ownership—especially if they have the leading
bid. A feeling that could make them behave as if they were the actual
owners. And if outbid a feeling of loss which could make them increase their
bids. The question I ask in this article is therefore, if pseudo-endowment
from having the leading bid will effect the bidders’ probability to increase
their bids if outbid?
This article presents evidence that bidders do in fact react according to such
a pseudo-endowment effect. In a unique data set of 17,000 internet auctions
for modern furniture the probability to increase a first max-bid when outbid
depends positively on two measures of ownership; 1) the amount of time
as the leading bidder and 2) the optimism measured as the depth from the
bidder’s max-bid to the current price in the auction. Moreover, these effects
are marginally decreasing so that small amounts of time or/and depth are
more important for the feeling of ownership. Theoretically, these results
hint at the process of setting a reference point from which a decision maker
measures losses and gains.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical founda-
tions of a pseudo-endowment. Section 3 describes the data and selects the
relevant bids. Rebidding is analyzed in Section 4 and Section 5 discusses
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and concludes.
2 Pseudo-Endowment
Reference-Dependent Preferences is the basic theory underlying a possible
pseudo-endowment effect. As presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
in their famous paper of Prospect Theory, people do generally think in rel-
ative rather than absolute terms which, for economic decisions, mean that
outcomes are usually compared to some reference—The Reference Point.
This is in fact in many settings a very clever way to utilize our cognitive
capacity very efficiently (Kahneman, 2003). However, since we dislike losses
much more than we like the same sized gains the reference point can become
very important for our decision making—not always in a positive way.. This
has been demonstrated in a wide range of settings from small scale consumer
decisions to large scale lifestyle decisions (See e.g. Tversky and Griffin (1991)
and Frederick and Loewenstein (1999)).
Although the theory has proven its validity and relevance through a vast
number of experiments in the last thirty years, a problem remains before the
theory can become a reliable tool for market analysis and policy making. The
exact reference point is in many settings ambiguous. In principle, you can
therefore get almost any prediction if you set the reference point accordingly.
Early in the literature the reference point was either explicitly controlled or
simply taken as the current endowment, hence the resulting “endowment ef-
fect”. This is a very reasonable assumption in laboratory experiments were
the endowment is the variable at stake and in focus of the subjects. Yet,
actual endowments are not necessarily the reference point from which we
measure losses and gains. Sen and Johnson (1997), for example, demon-
strate how possessing a coupon for a product can increase the preference
for that product. Another experiment by Carmon et al. (2003) shows how
prior presentation of one choice alternative increases the preference for that
alternative in a later choice. They both interpret this as a change in the
reference point such that choosing something else would feel like a loss.
Later developments in the theory have emphasized the role of Recent Expec-
tations as the reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). If you expect to
receive a wage increase of $3,000 it is likely that you get disappointed and
feel like you have incurred a loss if the actual wage increase ends up being
$1,000—even though it essentially is a gain to your current wage. Pseudo-
endowment1 is therefore when people expect to get to own something without
1Although Ariely, Heyman and Orhun (2004) use the term quasi-endowment for the
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actually owning it yet. However, expectations as such do not solve the prob-
lem of specifying the reference point as they too are often unknown.
One solution to this problem is the well-known method of assuming rational
expectations. Applied to decision making it means that decision makers
choose their expectations such that they will follow through on their plans
and fulfil these expectations2. But like rational expectations in general, this
assumption seems to be rather unrealistic. When bidders get involved in an
auction and end up paying more than initially intended, this is indeed an
example of how people do not follow through on their initial plans. From a
theoretical point of view this article is therefore part of the effort to clarify
how the reference point is constructed in real market settings.
3 The data
Lauritz.com is an auction house based primarily in Denmark, but with ac-
tivities in Germany, Noway, and Sweden. All their auctions are internet
auctions much like eBay.com, but there are some important differences. Lau-
ritz.com is not only an internet site, but also a physical auction house with
18 locations (2007) where the goods are located and available for inspection
during business hours. Potential bidders therefore have the opportunity to
examine the goods thoroughly before bidding. Moreover, Lauritz.com was
a traditional auction house before 2000 and has kept the tradition of mak-
ing an expert estimate of the value of the items. Both of these features
contribute to minimize the information about quality from other people’s
bidding. Thus theoretically there should be no reason for bidders to re-bid.
The particular data I have access to are from all the modern furniture auc-
tions in 2005 which amounts to about 37,000 auctions3. More specifically,
I have access to the complete bidding histories, i.e. exact time of bids and
bidders’ ID number etc., much like the available information on any eBay
auction just after expiry4. From these histories I can backtrack the bidders’
actual bids (as max-bids) and when they were submitted.
Furniture is one of the traditional goods for auction houses and especially
Lauritz.com have branded themselves as reselling classic Scandinavian furni-
feeling of ownership in auctions, pseudo-endowment was used by Prelec (1990) to describe
this general idea.
2This is the so-called Personal Equilibrium of Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
3In modern furniture there are two categories: 1) miscellaneous (29%) and 2) tables
and chairs (71%).
4The data used for this article is therefore in principle publicly available. I did, however,
receive the data directly from Lauritz.com with a few extras which is not used here.
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ture designs. While Laurtiz.com was well established on the Danish market
in 2005, this was a period of expansion in Germany and Sweden. I have
therefore limited my analysis to the 27,000 Danish auctions. Since this is an
analysis of rebidding, I need at least two bidders for one of them to face a
question of rebidding. Excluding some extreme auctions brings the number
of auctions down to 16,8645.
The typical auction procedure is that the seller brings the item to the nearest
auction house where an expert makes a valuation. If the seller is satisfied
with the valuation and the probable sale Lauritz.com puts it on the internet
site with auction expiration exactly one week later6. By policy none of the
auctions have a reserve price, but the first available bid is $50 (2005) since
this will cover the minimum fee to Lauritz.com for the seller. Generally the
seller pays 10% of the reached auction price (if above $500), and the buyer
must pay additionally 20% plus a fixed fee of $57.
During the auction bidders can either bid for the next available bid (the
current price plus some predetermined increment of e.g. $10) or use the
max-bid service (proxy bidder) and let the auction site bid for you. In
economic terms bidders can therefore bid as if it was a normal first price
ascending auction, or as if it was a sort of second price auction by putting
in their maximum bid. This bidding procedure is very close to the proxy
bidding system used on eBay, only the max-bids are also restricted to the
increments. However, if a bid arrives within the last 3 minutes the auction
is extended with 3 minutes. Thus, this is a so-called soft ending with always
at least 3 minutes of time to react.
Once the auction is over the winner can pick up the item at the physical
auction house. Due to the Danish Sale of Goods Act there is, however, the
rather peculiar feature that buyers can regret and return the item within
two weeks. Although this feature could potentially affect the bidding, it
does not present a problem to this analysis8.
5Only auctions with a valuation between $200 and $6,000 are included. Also there are
a few auctions with an error in the time of start that subsequently have been altered by
mistake, so they have been removed. These are the same auctions as used in Bramsen
(2008) except for 212 auction. In these two bidders have enter a max-bid in the exact same
second, which my procedure for backtracking bids cannot handle. These 212 auctions have
therefore also been excluded
6To even out the load some are put for sale or set for expiration during the evening,
but almost all the auctions have close to one week of duration, and the selected auctions
all have a duration of 7 days +/- 6 hours.
7Since these are Danish auctions all prices are originally in DKK, but they have here
been converted to USD where $1 = DKK 5 (2008).
8If there is uncertainty about WTP it can potentially make it less costly to bid too
much if you can regret. However, bidders will still have incentive to bid what they believe is
their WTP. It must therefore be the same underlying mechanisms that affect bidding with
71
The vast majority of the auctions are unique at the time of sale. Surely there
are some repetitions and classic furniture that are sold in greater numbers,
but it is rare to find competing items at a given time. With distinctive
items that are professionally valuated and the soft ending Lauritz.com is a
unique internet auction environment where almost all of the practical and
game theoretic arguments for bidding late are absent. From a neoclassical
point of view bidders who enter their willingness to pay (WTP) as a max-bid
sometime during the auction should therefore have no reason to rebid.
4 Selecting the relevant bids
Bidders may have different strategies and not all bids are therefore relevant.
Most bidders bid as if it was a normal English auction by simply bidding
the next available bid. In fact, this practice seems to be the dominating
behavior as 50.4% of all the bidders’ first bid is simply the next available
increment. Other bidders follow a sniping strategy bidding only during the
last minutes. It is impossible to know when these bidders actually reveal
their underlying WTP. Therefore it is also impossible to find out if and why
they increase it. Hence, the only feasible approach is to exclude all the bids
that are unlikely to reveal the true underlying WTP. Fortunately, the data
set is large enough to enable a critically selection of only the relevant bids.
The first step in this selection process is to disregard winning bids. Only
if the bidder is outbid there is reason to rebid. The next step is to select
only the first bid by a bidder and thus analyze the probability for rebidding
a second time. Surely, it could also be relevant to investigate factors which
affect rebidding a third or a fourth time, but a comparison between e.g. a
second and a third rebid will be problematic both to analyze and interpret.
Thus, with the greater amount of first bids these are the most optimal to
analyze.
Focusing on the first bid also have other advantages. If a bidder does not
want to put in her real WTP, but something lower, this is easier to discover
from the first bid compared to a second bid as the distance between the
WTP and the current auction price will be greater for the first bid. For
instance, if a bid is only 30% of the valuation made by Lauritz.com it is
difficult to believe that it is a true representation of the bidder’s WTP.
or without this option. Furthermore, there are transaction costs and only a very limited
number does actually use the option (in this data, 6.5%). In comparison to eBay, where
a bidder can ignore the purchase perhaps with a black listing as consequence, bidding on
Lauritz.com seems to be more committing.
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Following this logic, below is a list of restrictions which are designed to
rule out any first bid which is unlikely to represent the true WTP of the
bidder. The exact limits to these restriction are naturally rather arbitrary.
On the one hand a very tough restriction is preferable in order to limit our
attention only to the relevant bids, but on the other hand excluding too
many observations might weaken the generality of the results. In appendix
A I report a sensitivity analysis for the limits. Basically this shows that the
restrictions are not simply data mining and that the results are generally
valid for these data.
Too low a bid. If a bidder places a bid below 60% of the final price there
are to possibilities. Either this is not a serious representation of the
true WTP or this bidder does in fact have a very low valuation com-
pared to other bidders. By excluding low bids the analysis will possibly
be biased towards the behavior of bidders with high valuations. How-
ever these are usually the bidders who are important for the auction
outcome and in some sense a possible bias is therefore beneficial.
Just the next increment. If bidders at entry simply take the next avail-
able bid there are again two possibilities.The next bid just happens
to be the true WTP, or it is simply because this bidder is using the
auction as a simple English auction (as around half the bidders do).
The latter seems to be overwhelmingly likely. Still, excluding the few
true WTP will possibly screen out more late first bids as the price is
likely to be higher at the time. This will to some extend, however, be
taken into account by controlling for the time of entry.
Excluding professionals. In the literature experience and professional
motives are observed to diminish the endowment effect, see e.g. List
(2003). Excluding bidders that bid at more than 20 auctions dur-
ing 2005 will therefore get us closer to the underlying psychological
processes that might happen for a “normal” individual.
Too high a second bid. If your second bid is more than 20% higher than
the first bid, the first bid is not likely to be the true WTP. Although
the endowment effect might be a powerful mechanism I do not believe
that it will change the WTP dramatically from one bid to the other
as the comparison effect of paying more will also kick in9.
Too many bids. More than 5 bids from a bidder signals that the first
bid was not a true representation of the WTP, but rather part of
9Bidders will not only be loss averse against loosing the item, but also towards paying
more than expected. This was formulated as the comparison effect by Koszegi and Rabin
(2006)
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a strategy. It could of course happen that the bidder is provoked
(outbid) to reevaluate the WTP a large number of times. Still, this
would be a rare case and in my opinion it will not bias the outcome
to leave these out.
Too fast a second bid. Changing the bid within a short period could be
an indication of competition and pure “auction fever”. Furthermore,
as argued below rebidding within a short period is not likely to be
response to a real change in underlying preferences. Bids which are
rebid within 4 hours, will therefore be excluded10. However, as this
turns out to be a key restriction, I will discuss this in more detail in
the analysis.
It is of course impossible to ensure that all the remaining bids are represent-
ing the true underlying WTP. Still, in my opinion, these restrictions will
facilitate that the dominating behavior behind rebidding are real changes in
the preferences.
5 Analysis
Does pseudo-endowment from the first bid have an affect on a bidder’s prob-
ability to bid a second time if outbid? That is the basic question in this
article. My answer goes through a logit regression. More specifically, if yi is
a binary variable being 1 if the bidder rebids in observation i rebids and 0 if
the bidder does not rebid, then yi can be described by a binomial distribu-
tion where yi ∼ B(1, pi) for i = 1, .., N . I assume that pi can be described
using a logit model specified as:
ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
= f(pseudo-endowmenti) + g(controlsi) + ǫi
where ǫi is a random stochastic variable. In the analysis I will apply different
specifications of pseudo-endowment indicated by f(), but there are also other
factors which could explain the rebidding. In order to get unbiased results,
and also to get the best possible fit, all such variables need to be part of the
logistic regression. I will use these controls in the simplest possible model.
Thus, g() will be a linear function specifying all control variables. Below is
a list of the controls11:
10The closer to finish the faster you may update your reference point. One idea could
be to construct this restrictions in such a way that the closer to expiry the smaller break.
However, bidding the last day and rebidding again soon after could also be an indication
of auction fever. I will therefore not vary this restriction.
11Summary statistics of the controls can be found in Appendix A
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Time of entry If a bidder is looking for some special item she is more
likely to find it earlier in the auction period than bidders who are just
randomly searching. Hence, early bidders might have higher WTP.
This is in itself not a problem if the bidder really bids her maximum
WTP. However, as the price is likely to be lower early in the auction
this can act as an anchor depressing the first bid. The probability to
rebid could for this reason be higher.
Experience Bidders on Lauritz.com do not have ratings like on eBay. In
stead I can directly count how many times they participate in modern
furniture auctions during 2005. Although I exclude the bidders which
participate in more than 20 auctions (“The professionals”), some ex-
perience might also diminish the pseudo-endowment effect and the
tendency to rebid.
Valuation As mentioned in section 3 Lauritz.com lists an estimate of the
final price to guide both the sellers and the buyers. For expensive
items (e.g. with a valuation of $4000) bidders might hesitate to put
in their true WTP. As a consequence they might be more inclined to
increase their bid later in the auction.
Price at entry Arelative low price at entry compared to the actual value
(the final price) might depress the bidders entry bid—just as a high
valuation or early bids could do. Again this will make a rebid more
likely.
5.1 Duration of ownership
Recall that pseudo-endowment was defined in section 2 as expectations to
buy. Although “expectations” sounds simple it is a complex cognitive con-
struction which is impossible to quantify directly. One simple approach is to
ignore the expectations per se and focus on another necessary component:
The amount of time used to form these expectations.
That time could be an important factor is exactly why internet auctions
are of particular interest. During the typical auction that lasts a full week
there is plenty of time for bidders to get used to the idea of buying and
incorporate this into their expectations.
Empirical support for this idea can be found in Strahilevitz and Loewenstein
(1998) where the endowment effect is significantly increased with longer
periods of ownership. Even more related is the laboratory experiment by
Ariely, Heyman and Orhun (2004). In a simulated auction they show how
bidders bid significantly higher if they have pseudo-ownership, i.e. if they
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have the leading bid for several bidding rounds as compared to a single bid
with no ownership12.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Intercept -0.43*** -0.73*** -0.49***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09)
Time of entry -0.087*** -0.071*** -0.056***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016)
Experience -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Valuation 0.00013* 0.00013* 0.00013*
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Price at entry -0.40** -0.36** -0.28*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
t 0.004 0.75***
(0.026) (0.12)
t2 -0.30***
(0.05)
t3 0.03***
(0.01)
ln(t) 0.047***
(0.007)
-2Loglikelihood 6913.1 6865.7 6864.6
Significant codes: *** ≤0.001, ** ≤0.01, * ≤0.05
Null deviance (-2L): 6997.5 on 6092 degrees of freedom
Table 1: Logit regressions on the effect of the leading bid in days
The first proxy for pseudo-endowment I will deploy is therefore the duration
in days as the leading bidder from the first bid. I denote this measure
t. Table 1 shows the results for three different specifications of the logit
regression. For all parameters in the specific model the estimates are shown
with significance levels. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. As
indicated by the Loglikelihood values the best fit is found with a formulation
of f(t) = ln(t) in Model 1c.
From Table 1 it can be difficult to see the actual effect of being the leading
bidder and in Figure 1 is the predicted effect of t (black solid line), and
95% confidence interval (dashed) for the median bidder. A median bidder
participates in a furniture auction 5 times in 2005, enters at day 5.44, the
12A similar test on real auction data is performed by Wolf et al. (2005). They find a
positive effect of duration as the leading bidder on the probability to re-bid, but the effect
is not significant. However, eBay data is generally problematic as there are also other
reasons (e.g. common value) for increasing the bid.
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Figure 1: Predicted effect of having the leading bid
valuation of the item $400, and the price at entry turned out to be 30% of
the final price.
That ln(t) is the best fit compared to for instance a quadratic or cubic form
suggests a high initial effect that will slowly fade13. In other words, these
initial results suggest that most of the shift in reference point happens during
the first 6 hours after the actual change in probabilities.
Both the level of probabilities and the magnitude of the pseudo-endowment
effect depend on the controlling variables14. Figure 1 also shows the es-
timates for a bidder which only participated once (The novice) and for a
bidder which participates 15 times this year (The experienced). Compared
to the median bidder the data can therefore confirm the hypothesis that
more experience diminish the probability to rebid and indirectly also the
pseudo-endowment effect. Similarly, Table 1 shows that high valuation low
price at entry, and early entry will increase the probability to rebid. All the
controls therefore have the expected signs.
As mentioned in section 3 the result is rather dependent on the last selection
criteria, i.e. excluding fast rebidding. In fact, if this selection criterion is
ignored and more of the rebids are made within a few minutes the effect
13The results of other specifications can be obtained from the author upon request.
14With the simple functional form is it not possible to distinguish between direct effect
on probabilities and an effect through t.
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of t is reversed. Table 2 shows the coefficients of ln(t) in logit regressions
with a less strict restriction. This reveals that if rebids within less than 6
minutes are allowed these fast rebids will dominate the sample and the effect
of pseudo-ownership disappears. This illustrates a clear distinction between
Restriction 2 min 6 min 15 min 1 hour 4 hours
Coefficient -0.026 0.000 0.015 0.030 0.047
N 7309 6984 6741 6462 6093
Table 2: Including fast rebidding
auction fever and the pseudo-endowment effect. I speculate that auction
fever is when bidders get aroused and caught in a bidding competition. If
bidders rebid within only a few minutes this must be an indication of auction
fever as opposed to a real change in underlying preferences. That is exactly
what the data shows. From this perspective, I think this finding supports
the idea of pseudo-endowment.
5.2 Optimism
Although time is an important factor in changing the reference point I take
this analysis one step further and focus directly on the expectations to buy.
Expectations must be related to the bidders’ beliefs about winning. Hence,
from a logical point of view other factors to consider are the factors which
could affects the bidders’ subjective probability to win.
Imagine that bidders are rational in their beliefs about winning. What
would then be a reasonable model of their subjective probability to win?
This approach is taken by Bramsen (2007) where the bidding behavior of a
Reference-Dependent bidder is modeled. Basically, the probability to win is
based on some underlying probability distribution of prices which is updated
during the auction. At a given time the probability to win can therefore be
calculated as the cumulative probabilities to win below the bidders max-bid.
Naturally, we do not know the bidders’ underlying beliefs about probabili-
ties. Still, the perceived probability to win must be a function of the distance
from the current price to the max-bid. If for instance the bidder places a
max-bid of $1000 she must be more optimistic about the chance to win if
the current price in the auction is $200 as compared to $900. This distance
or “depth” of pseudo-ownership is therefore a proxy for optimism and hence
another measure of the amount of pseudo-endowment.
To illustrate this measure consider Figure 2. Here the bidder puts in a
max-bid of $1000 at a point where the current price is $270. The leading
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Figure 2: Measuring Pseudo-Endowment
bidder at this point has a max-bid of $400 which causes the current price
to change immediately to $420 (the next increment). The initial depth can
therefore be expressed as the distance between $1000 and $420. During the
duration of ownership a couple of other bidders enter new bids which cause
the current price to increase and the depth to decrease. At the point where
a bidder bids $1040 (the increment above $1000) or more the leading bid is
lost.
Figure 2 also illustrates that for many bidders the level of optimism will de-
crease during pseudo-ownership. Bidders will most likely observe the depth
at some points in time during this period of pseudo-ownership, but it is
impossible to know exactly when. As a general measure I will therefore use
the expected depth at a random time. This corresponds to using a weighted
average of the depth. I will denote this d¯.
There is one problem with using depth as the proxy for optimism. When the
depth is zero, i.e. the current price equals the max-bid of the bidder there
is still a chance to win. Yet in a regression there is no difference between
zero as in zero depth, and zero, as in outbid. To solve this problem I will
therefore use a dummy if the bidders max-bid equals the current price. This
dummy will be assigned a possible effect of ownership with zero depth.
In Table 3 the results of the four different logit regressions using ln(t) and d¯
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in various ways are reported. Again, a logistic transformation of d¯ has the
best fit as in model 2b15. In model 2c I also include an interaction effect,
but this is not significant. Initially I therefore conclude that model 2b to be
the best model.
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d
Intercept -0.72*** -1.46*** -1.37*** -1.40***
(0.10) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15)
Time of entry -0.0036 -0.0009 -0.0039 0.0006
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0183)
Experience -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Valuation 0.000023 0.000018 0.000013 0.000031
(0.000071) (0.000068) (0.000068) (0.000062)
Price at entry -0.25 -0.29* -0.31* -0.29*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
ln(t) 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.25**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
d¯ 0.00025***
(0.00007)
ln(d¯) 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03)
ln(t)*ln(d¯) -0.02
(0.01)
ln(t · d¯) 0.14***
(0.02)
Dummy 1.36*** 2.03*** 3.49*** 2.03***
(0.28) (0.32) (0.98) (0.32)
-2Loglikelihood 6829.4 6820.5 6818.0 6820.8
Significant codes: *** ≤0.001, ** ≤0.01, * ≤0.05
Null deviance (-2L): 6997.5 on 6092 degrees of freedom
Table 3: Logit regressions on the effect of time and depth
Figure 3a illustrates the predicted values and 95% confidence intervals of
model 2b for the median bidder with a duration of ownership of 19.5 hours.
In addition to this effect there is often a link between low depth and short
duration of ownership. Thus, the effect of low depth will often be enhanced
by short ownership16.
15If the average depth is zero I replace ln(d¯) = −Inf with zero. Hence the effect of
depth will be assigned to the dummy.
16Similarly will the dummy also be correlated to short duration of ownership. It is
therefore difficult to interpret the exact effect of the dummy. What is important is the
sign of the effect as this suggests that having no depth, but still ownership will have a
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Adding depth to the regression, i.e. expand model 1c to 2b, increases the
effect of duration substantially. Figure 3b illustrates the effect of having the
leading bid for the median bidder with an average depth of $28. However, a
little caution must be made because of the dummy, and a direct comparison
is not possible. Still, the fact that the effect does not decrease must indicate
that depth does not take any of the explanatory power away from dura-
tion. In other words, depth seems to be an entirely additional component
of pseudo-endowment not explained by the duration.
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Figure 3: Intentions at Entry and Pocket Money
Another observation for model 2b is that the estimated coefficient for ln(d¯),
βˆ
d¯
= 0.16, is very close to that of ln(t). This raises the question if βt = βd¯ as
in model 2d. A likelihood ratio test comparing model 2b and 2d shows that
this hypothesis cannot be rejected (p=0.58). An alternative description of
the pseudo-endowment effect is therefore βln(t)+βln(d¯) = βln(t · d¯). Hence,
the change in reference point must be closely related to the area t · d¯, which
is another way of describing the total area between the max-bid and the
current auction price in Figure 2.
Although I use the weighted average of depth as the proxy for optimism,
another reasonable hypothesis is that depth right after entry would have
greater importance for the bidders’ optimism than a random time. Yet, the
estimated coefficient for an additional variable measuring initial depth is
not significant. This hypothesis can therefore not be supported17. Another
hypothesis is that a large depth late in the period of ownership will increase
the loss of paying more and make the bidder less likely to rebid. But again
positive effect on the probability to rebid compared to no ownership at all.
17I measure the depth after 1 or 5 minutes after entry.
81
this cannot be supported by the data18. Thus, it seems as if the best possible
proxy for optimism is the weighted average depth. In other word, the feeling
of ownership is directly related to the logarithm of the total area between
the current price and the max-bid no matter the shape.
This observation summarizes the results in a simple and illustrative model.
First of all, optimism and duration can substitute each other in a straight-
forward manner. For instance, lower depth can be compensated with longer
duration as the leading bidder. Also, a relative less optimistic start can
be compensated if there is less decrease in optimism later in the period of
pseudo-ownership.
Another intuitive aspect is the diminishing sensitivity on the reference point
in both dimensions. More pseudo-ownership, both in dollars and in duration,
will lead to an increase in the pseudo-endowment effect, but the effect is
marginally decreasing.
6 Discussion
You do not get the actual ownership after a bid in internet auctions. Nev-
ertheless, this analysis suggests that there is an endowment effect of being
the leading bidder, i.e. a pseudo-endowment effect. For the subset of bids
which is likely to represent WTP, both time as leading bidder and optimism
about chances to win is facilitating that a bidder is getting attached to the
item and thus willing to pay more when outbid. This study therefore con-
firms two hypotheses about the creation of a reference point; 1) that it takes
some “getting used to” before people adjust to new beliefs and 2) that the
reference point, at least to some extend, is based upon rational beliefs about
future outcomes.
For those not impressed by the magnitude of the pseudo-endowment effect
found in these data, this might only be the tip of the iceberg. Many people
do not enter the auction until the last minute, perhaps as part of a strategy.
But in my opinion they will still form expectation about their chance to
win at a given bid which they are going to place. In fact, if they do not
enter, the current price will be lower so they might even get more optimistic
about their chance to win. Thus, some of the behavior I disregard as auction
fever due to fast rebidding could in reality be caused by pseudo-endowment
18Nor a measure of depth five minutes before outbid or a measure of necessary increase
in the payment from five minutes before outbid to five minutes after have significant
coefficients in a logit regression. These analysis can be provided by the author upon
request.
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created before entering.
Naturally, the data is noisy and it might be a bit hastily to conclude in details
how the reference point is created. In the time dimension the marginally
decreasing speed of adjustment could simply be a result of the natural focus
of the bidders. Just after placing the bid the bidder is likely to think a lot
about the auction and therefore adjust the reference point relatively fast.
However, the speed of adjustment will vary a lot between the bidders and
depend on the specific situation19. Still, as a general model for the reference
point the marginally decreasing speed of adjustment might not be a bad
starting point. A reasonable model for this could e.g. be the lagged model
of Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) where new beliefs partly replace the
reference point of last period.
Pseudo-endowment might only be one of the factors affecting a change in
preferences during the auction. For instance, if the bidders have price sen-
sitive preferences as suggested in Ariely, Koszegi, Mazar and Shampan’er
(2004), the rising price in itself will increase the WTP. Although this could
raise some doubt about the pseudo-endowment effect, I think it mainly helps
to explain some of the additional noise in the data and the reason why some
of the bidders in the sample rebid more than once.
At a more general level the pseudo-endowment effect found here supports the
fact that expectations play a major role for the reference point. Moreover,
the relatively fast effect of entry suggests that a shift in reference point could
be relevant in many other settings. For instance, if you go shopping and see
something you fancy it is not at all unlikely that you will get attached to the
item and change your reference point in time to make the purchase despite
your initial objection to pay the price. Similarly, this could be the case in
many other settings where a seller, your employer, or even your family is
successful in affecting your expectations. Thus, the endowment effect can
prove to be relevant far beyond the initial applications.
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APPENDIX
A Sensitivity Analysis
An important point in the analysis is to select the bids which are credible to
be the bidders underlying WTP. In section 4 I present 5 restrictions which
are designed to screen away bids that is unlikely to be WTP. Below are four
tables which shows a sensitivity analysis for the first four restrictions (the
last is treated in section 5.1). In my view they basically show that the result
is relative insensitive to the exact limits of the restrictions. In fact, you could
get larger coefficients from other limits. Thus with these restrictions I have
tried to maximize the likelihood of observing WTP—not the coefficients.
Restriction 1: To low a first bid
≥ pct. of final price 0 40% 60% 80%
Coefficient for ln(t) 0.065 0.050 0.047 0.058
Number of obs 14886 9498 6093 2974
Restriction 2: First bid is just the next increment
Including increments Yes No
Coefficient for ln(t) 0.031 0.047
Number of obs 9315 6093
Restriction 3: Excluding professionals
Participated in less than 10 20 50
Coefficient for ln(t) 0.059 0.047 0.042
Number of obs 4605 6093 7780
Restriction 4: Maximum bid increase from first to second bid
Bid Increase ≤ 10% 20% None
Coefficient for ln(t) 0.043 0.047 0.051
Number of obs 5438 6093 6447
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B Summary statistics for controlling variables
In the logit regressions I apply some controlling variables in order to iso-
late the effects of duration and depth of ownership. For the sample used
(N=6093) the summary statistics for these variables are:
Entry at (days) Participated Valuation P/V at entry
Min. : 0.0 1 200 0.00
1st Qu.: 3.3 2 300 0.18
Median : 5.5 5 400 0.30
3rd Qu.: 6.4 9 700 0.48
Max. : 7.2 19 4600 3.10
Mean : 4.8 6.3 559 0.35
More summary statistics on the data can be provide upon request.
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Abstract
A classic argument in economics is that experience in the market
place will eliminate mistakes and cognitive biases. Internet auctions
are a popular market were some bidders gather extensive experience.
In a unique data set from a Scandinavian auction site I question if
and what bidders learn. At face value experienced bidders do adapt
better bidding strategies. However, the so-called pseudo-endowment
effect does not disappear. Regardless of their experience, bidders will
be inclined to increase their willingness to pay as a response to having
had “ownership” (the leading bid) before being outbid. Thus, this data
can confirm that feedback, and especially negative feedback, seems to
be a critical component in learning.
Keywords: Experience, Learning, Internet auctions, Reference-Dependent
Preferences, Endowment Effect, Bidding behavior, eBay.
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1 Introduction
A long standing debate between Neoclassical and Behavioral Economists
is whether experience eliminates cognitive biases in decision making. The
neoclassical argument is that irrationality will be exploited in the market.
Thus, participants need to become rational if they are to continue trading.
Underlying this learning argument is basically three conditions. First of all,
past experiences need to be both relevant and applicable for the specific
decision problem. Most people would have extensive experience in buying
clothes, but only little experience in buying a house. Generally, we would
therefore expect participants to learn more about buying clothes than buying
houses.
Second, learning by your mistakes requires that you realize these mistakes.
For instance, some buyers of 4x4 SUVs might actually be better off with a
more economical MPV, but if they do not realize that, they will continue
to buy SUVs. Generally the outcome must provide positive or negative
feedback about the decision, and the decision maker will need to reflect and
be able to act upon this feedback.
Finally, if rationality is taught by the market, the market must be character-
ized by rational behavior. If stock markets, for instance, are characterized
by irrational exuberance, it may not be optimal to base decision on ratio-
nal models (at least in the short run), and it may certainly be difficult to
learn to be rational. Behavior taught by the market is therefore not always
rational as such.
Internet auctions have made auctions available for everyone. In this market
we find both the amateurs who are bidding for the first time, the bidders
with extensive experience and the professionals who are buying with the
purpose of re-sale. In this standardized environment there is no doubt that
experiences from one auction are relevant to other auctions. Internet auc-
tions are therefore a market setting where we can zoom in on the second
and third condition and test if and what bidders learn.
This is not the first study to consider the effect of experience in internet auc-
tions. In the early paper by Wilcox (2000) experience is found to change the
bidding behavior and make late bidding more pronounced. As this observa-
tion is found in eBay data, where this could be the dominating strategy1, he
concludes that bidders learn to be more rational. Similar observations have
1Due to e.g. hard endings and common value. For an overview on this, see Bajari and
Hortacsu (2004)
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been performed by e.g. Ockenfels and Roth (2002) and Borle et al. (2006).
Although these observations surely reveal that experience does play a role,
the unique data behind the present study allows me to explore this deeper.
Lauritz.com is a Scandinavian auction site with a proxy bidding system
much like eBay’s. Yet, there are important differences in the setup such
that late bidding is no longer the strategically dominating strategy. In fact,
the analysis in Bramsen (2008a) concludes that an early bid is the optimal
strategy. From that point of view this article can confirm that experience
does improve bidding by making bidders bid earlier and fewer times.
That experienced bidders are able to change their bidding towards more
optimal strategies is not necessarily the same as saying that they are able
to decrease their cognitive biases and become rational. In fact this article
presents evidence that this is not the case.
When bidders at some point start expecting to win, the prospect of losing
can make bidders increase their willingness to pay. This pseudo-endowment
effect is found in both the laboratory by Ariely et al. (2004) and empirically
from inexperienced bidders by Bramsen (2008b). This article continues down
this path and demonstrates that even with extensive experience, the average
bidder will still be affected by having had the leading bid.
Generally, this article demonstrates that if the feedback is teaching us to
become more rational, we can learn. But if feedback is either missing, weak
or delayed, mistakes and biases can be difficult to eliminate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the auction and the
data used. Section 3 explores the development in bidding as bidders get
more experienced and section 4 is concerned with the pseudo-endowment
effect. Section 5 draws parallels to the literature and concludes.
2 The data
Lauritz.com is an auction house based primarily in Denmark, but with ac-
tivities in Germany, Norway and Sweden. All their auctions are internet
auctions much like eBay.com, but there are some important differences. Lau-
ritz.com is not only an internet site, but also a physical auction house with
18 locations (2008) where the goods are located and available for inspection
during business hours. Potential bidders therefore have the opportunity to
examine the goods thoroughly before bidding. Lauritz.com was a traditional
auction house before 2000 and has kept the tradition of making an expert
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estimate of the value of the items. Most, if not all, the necessary information
for evaluating the item’s common and private value is therefore accessible
from the start.
The particular data I have access to are from all the modern furniture auc-
tions in 2005, which amount to about 37,000 auctions2. More specifically,
I have access to the complete bidding histories, i.e. exact time of bids, the
bidders’ ID numbers etc., much like the available information on any eBay
auction just after expiry3. From these histories I can backtrack the bid-
ders’ actual bids (both incremental- and max-bids), and when they were
submitted.
Furniture is one of the traditional goods for auction houses, and especially
Lauritz.com has branded itself as reselling classic Scandinavian furniture
designs. Although it is classic designs, the vast majority of the furniture for
sale is different and normally there are no competing auctions with similar
furniture at the same time.
While Laurtiz.com was well established on the Danish market in 2005, this
was a period of expansion in Germany and Sweden. I have therefore limited
my analysis to the 27,000 Danish auctions. Since this is an analysis of
bidding behavior, I have limited the data to auctions with at least two
bidders4. Excluding some extreme auctions brings the number of auctions
down to 16,8645.
The typical auction procedure is that the seller brings the item to the nearest
auction house where an expert makes a valuation. If the seller is interested
in selling, Lauritz.com puts it on the internet site with auction expiration
exactly one week later6. By policy none of the auctions have a reserve price,
but the first available bid is $50 (2005) since this will cover the minimum fee
2Modern furniture consists of two categories: 1) miscellaneous (29%) and 2) tables and
chairs (71%).
3The data used for this article is therefore in principle publicly available. I did, however,
receive the data directly from Lauritz.com with a few extras which are not used here.
4Excluding auctions with only one bidder will bias the observed bidding bidding behav-
ior. However, the behavior in auctions with one bidder seems less interesting and may also
be adversely biased for this purpose. I have therefore chosen not to include these. This
will also allow a more direct comparison to second part of the analysis, since competition
is needed to activate the pseudo-endowment effect.
5Only auctions with a valuation between $200 and $6,000 are included. Also, there are
a few auctions with an error in the time of start that subsequently have been altered by
mistake and have therefore been removed. The remaining auctions are the same as used
in Bramsen (2008a) and Bramsen (2008b)
6To even out the load some are put for sale or set for expiration during the evening,
but almost all the auctions have close to one week of duration, and the selected auctions
all have a duration of 7 days +/- 6 hours.
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to Lauritz.com for the seller. Generally, the seller pays 10% of the reached
auction price (if above $500), and the buyer must pay additionally 20% plus
a fixed fee of $57.
During the auction bidders can either make the next available bid (the cur-
rent price plus some predetermined increment of e.g. $10) or use the max-bid
service (proxy bidder) and let the auction site bid for them. In economic
terms bidders can therefore bid as if it was a normal first price ascending
auction, or as if it was a sort of second price auction by putting in their
maximum bid. This bidding procedure is very close to the proxy bidding
system used on eBay, only the max-bids are also restricted to the incre-
ments. However, if a bid arrives within the last 3 minutes, the auction is
extended with 3 minutes. This is a so-called soft ending with always at least
3 minutes of time to react.
Once the auction is over the winner can pick up the item at the physical
auction house. Due to the Danish Sale of Goods Act there is, however, the
rather peculiar feature that buyers can regret and return the item within
two weeks. Although this feature could potentially affect the bidding, it
does not present a problem to this analysis8.
Although some bidders without doubt think a lot about how and when
to bid, theoretically there should be no effect of bidding behavior. The
objective valuation and the possibility to see the item physically minimizes
the information about value from other people’s bidding. The common value
argument for bidding late is therefore in theory absent. Furthermore, the
soft ending minimizes the possibility to surprise incremental bidders with a
late bid. Hence, this argument for bidding late as mentioned in the literature
is also missing9. Finally, as there are no auctions directly competing with
each other at the same time, bidders do not need to wait and see which one
to bid for. From a neoclassical point of view bidders should therefore simply
minimize their transaction costs and put in their maximum willingness to
pay as a max-bid at the point where they discover the auction.
7Since these are Danish auctions all prices are originally in DKK. The conversion rate
used throughout is 1 USD = 5 DKK (2008).
8If there is uncertainty about WTP it can potentially make it less costly to bid. How-
ever, bidders will still have incentive to bid what they believe is their WTP. It must
therefore be the same underlying mechanisms that affect bidding with or without this
option. Furthermore, there are transaction costs and only a very limited number does
actually use the option (in this data, 6.5%). In comparison to eBay, where a bidder can
ignore the purchase (perhaps with a black-listing as consequence) bidding on Lauritz.com
seems to be more committing.
9See e.g. Ockenfels and Roth (2006) for a theoretical and empirical analysis on this.
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3 Bidding strategies
Most literature on experience in internet auctions have so far focused on the
actual bidding behavior. Wilcox (2000), for instance, finds that experience
leads to fewer bids and more late bidding. Similar results have been found by
Ockenfels and Roth (2002) and Borle et al. (2006). This analysis therefore
start by simply comparing the timing and amount of bidding by different
groups of bidders characterized by their experience.
In furniture auctions on Lauritz.com you can find several kinds of bidders.
At present (2008) the number of new sign-ups is 8000 pr month, indicating a
high amount of newcomers and amateurs. On the other side of the spectrum
there are bidders who participate in several hundred furniture auctions per
year and win auctions by the dozen10. It would be quite exceptional for
private consumers to buy more than a handful expensive furniture during
only one year. Hence, I also expect that there are professional bidders with
a motive of re-sale.
Optimally, there would be data on the single bidder’s total participation
since sign-up. Moreover, it could be useful to know if, for instance, the
user is private or professional. However, the only available information is
the bidding for modern furniture per buyer id during 2005. I will therefore
use the number of auctions which the single bidder has participated in as a
proxy for classifying the bidder.
In Table 1 I have defined five groups of bidders depending on their level of
participation during 200511. The table also shows the number of bidders in
each group (Bidders) and the total combination of bidder and auction (N),
i.e. the unit of observation. Similarly, you can also find the total number of
bidders (Bidderssub) and the number of observations they represent (Nsub)
from the subset used in Section 4.
An alternative way of defining these groups could be to include the number
of wins. Due to transaction costs you could, for instance, expect professional
bidders to have at least a certain percentage of wins. Yet, using winning
as part of the definition would create an endogeneity problem. I suspect
that a high proportion of wins will at least partly be a result of the bidding
behavior. Thus, the simple definition in Table 1 will be used throughout the
paper.
10In this data up to 1554 auctions and 212 wins during 2005.
11Whereas all other measure are calculated on the selected subset with more than one
bidder, the participation is a measure of total participation of all modern furniture auctions
in 2005
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Group name Participation Bidders N Bidderssub Nsub
Novice [0, 5] 18,024 28,863 3,022 3,403
Amateur [6, 20] 3,800 24,167 1,636 2,796
Experienced [21, 50] 739 14,356 486 1,611
Semi-Prof. [51, 200] 322 17,868 257 1,789
Professional [201,∞] 56 15,467 48 1,912
Total - 22,941 100,721 5,449 11,511
Table 1: Definition of groups
Perhaps the most important part of a bidding strategy is when to bid. Es-
pecially the time of entry has been discussed widely in the literature. Figure
1 shows the empirical distributions of the first bid during the week of the
auctions for the 5 groups. More specifically, the proportions of first bids for
each day is plotted in a histogram for each group, where the total area of
each histogram is 1.
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Figure 1: Timing of first bid
Generally, bidders enter either the first or last day perhaps due to two sub-
categories at the site: “New items” and “Last chance”. Still, there is a
significant development in the timing of entry as bidders get more experi-
enced. Beginners have a tendency to bid on the last day while this shifts
towards the first day for the “Professionals”. Thus, experience leads to
earlier entry.
The timing of bids has typically been coupled to late bids and sniping. With
this in mind, I have measured the bidding according to the three following
definitions;
Late bids If a bidder bids within the last hour, I measure this as a “Late
bid”.
Sniping bids If the bidder bids within the last 10 minutes, I phrase this
as a “Sniping bid”
Bidding wars If a bidder bids two times within the last 10 minutes, i.e.
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she bids and rebids as a response to another bidder’s bid, I interpret
this as willingness to engage in a “Bidding war”.
I do not have data for possible extensions due to the 3 minutes rule (soft
ending). The exact time of finish in the data is therefore including possible
extensions. As a consequence, some “late bids” may have been intended to
be sniping bids. This is the reasoning behind the rather wide limit of 10
minutes for “sniping bids”.
For each bidder I calculate the share of the auctions in the subset where
she is represented with such bids. In Appendix A there is three plots with
every bidder’s percentage. Naturally, there is quite a variation, especially if
the bidder only participated a few times. There is, however, a clear picture
if you consider the average for the 5 bidding groups. They are shown in
Figure 2. Novice bidders, for instance, use sniping bids in 15% on average
of the auctions they participate in, while Experienced use sniping in 7%
on average. Unambiguously, these averages indicate that as bidders get
more experienced they less often make late bids, sniping bids and engage in
bidding wars.
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Figure 2: Group averages for late bidding
Although this is a very clear picture it could, in principle, be due to the
group limits. To reject any doubt, two smoothing regressions are therefore
added to each of the plots in Appendix A—the difference being a different
level of smoothing. Basically, these regressions all confirm that late bidding
in any form is less frequent when bidders become more experienced12.
Another typical subject is the number of bids per auction. Figure 3 shows
12There is a shifts within the group of professionals, but this is due to the low number
of observations and should therefore not be of any concern.
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the distribution of actual bids per auction for the 5 groups 13. Again, there
is a clear effect of experience. As bidders learn, they use fewer bids per
auction and in more than 67% of the auctions which the “Professionals”
participate in, they only bid once. This downtrend is also confirmed by the
plot and smoothing regressions in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Number of bids per auction
Generally, by looking at the data we can therefore observe a clear devel-
opment in the bidding behavior with experience. As further confirmation
Table shows the result of simple regressions with ln(Participation) as the
explanatory variable. Comparing with the standard deviations in brackets
it is evident that in all the cases the negative estimate for ln(Participation)
is three-star significant.
No. of bids Late bids Sniping Wars
Intercept 3.05 0.282 0.162 0.071
(0.02) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(Participation) -0.25 -0.043 -0.027 -0.014
(0.02) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Table 2: Effect of experience - simple regressions
The overall conclusion must be that bidders do learn something. Yet, it
is still not totally obvious what it is they learn. Before addressing this
question, it could be useful to explore the winning ratio, i.e. the number of
auctions the bidder is winning as a fraction of the total number of auctions
she participates in.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of winning ratios for the five groups. Al-
though the mean is diminishing with participation, the picture is a bit more
ambiguous. To further illustrate, Figure 5 shows a plot of all the bidders
winning ratio compared to their participation level. Moreover, the predic-
tions of two different smoothing regressions are also shown—the dark grey
being more smoothing. Group limits are indicated with thin broken lines.
13Note: Above 8 bids per auction is accumulated in the last bar.
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Figure 4: Distribution in winning ratios
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Figure 5: Average winning ratio (bidder)
A little caution must be exercised evaluating the winning ratio for Novice
bidders. These will naturally have a tendency either to win or not to win as
many of them only participate once or twice, but this division could also be
a result of underlying preferences. On one side, there might be bidders that
simply use the auction as entertainment. On the other side, there could be
bidders that find exactly what they have been looking for, and price will be
of less importance. However, this does not seem to be a major problem here
as the smoothing regressions are, in fact, smooth.
Overall, the conclusion must be that bidders who participates more is win-
ning less often. Yet, this is not necessarily the same as saying that experience
makes the bidder less successful. Indeed, I will argue that the opposite is
true. Perhaps it is exactly due to learning that bidders win less often. If the
main objective is to get a good deal it may not be optimal to win all the
auctions you participate in.
The literature on eBay argues that sniping is the optimal behavior ( see e.g.
the review of Bajari and Hortacsu (2004)). This auction is, as described
in Section 2, very different on key points and sniping is not necessarily the
optimal bidding strategy on Lauritz.com. The analysis in Bramsen (2008a)
does, in fact, suggest the opposite for this auction. The reason is that early
bids will scare of potential bidders, who otherwise would have been willing
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to run up the bid if they had entered.
In that case bidders do seem to adapt a more optimal bidding strategy.
Fewer bids and earlier entry indicate that bidders learn to use max-bids.
This will save transaction costs, but perhaps more importantly, it can scare
off bidders and depress the winning bid.
Some of the bidders in the group “Professionals” do seem to win more often.
and the smoothing regression does make an upward shift for the bidders with
the most experience in Figure 5. However, this nicely corresponds to the
argument that real professionals might have higher transactions costs for
bidding and must therefore win more often compared to amateur bidders,
who also bid for fun.
In sum, these data can basically support the underlying conclusions from
previous studies on eBay data. Experience will make bidders more com-
fortable with the proxy bidding procedure and make them bid fewer times.
Moreover, as argued, experience will also make the timing of bids more
optimal.
4 Pseudo-endowment
Auctions have traditionally been blamed for causing “auction fever”, and
internet auctions seem not to be the exception. For instance, there are
studies which show that bidders on eBay end up paying much more than
from other relevant alternatives because they “get caught by the game”
(Lee and Malmendier, 2006; Ariely and Simonsen, 2003). Although these
are extreme examples, they are part of the evidence suggesting that bidders
change their willingness to pay (WTP) during the auction (see also Bajari
and Hortacsu (2003) and Bramsen (2008a)). The bidding as such is therefore
just part of the test for rationality through market experience.
One explanation behind increasing bids is that bidders start to see the auc-
tion as a competition where winning is the aim (Lee and Malmendier, 2006;
Wolf et al., 2006). In such a case you would expect bidders to make more
late bidding where the “battle” to win is the most intense. If so, the devel-
opment in late bidding as observed in Section 3 does suggest that experience
diminishes “auction fever”.
Competition is not the only possible reason behind increasing bids. Bidders
might actually change their underlying WTP during the auction if they get
attached to the item. More specifically, as bidders start to expect to win they
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might be affected by a sort of endowment effect—even though they do not
has the actual ownership yet. Such a pseudo-endowment14 effect have been
found in a laboratory experiment by Ariely et al. (2004) and empirically by
Bramsen (2008b). The effect of experience on the pseudo-endowment effect
is therefore another test for the hypothesis that market experience will lead
to rationality.
The critical and problematic element in asking what changes WTP is that
I, in fact, have no way of knowing what a bidder’s actual WTP is. Yet, by
critically disregarding any bid that simply cannot be a credible representa-
tion of a bidder’s WTP, chances are that at least a significant proportion of
the remaining bids are representing WTP. This is the approach of Bramsen
(2008b) and will also be the approach here.
Following the argumentation in Bramsen (2008b) the exact selection criteria
of the bids in the 100,721 auction·bidder sample from section 3 are:
Only bids that are outbid There is no reason for a bidder to revise WTP
and rebid if her bid is not outbid.
First bids only Although all bids might represent WTP I chose to focus
only on the first bid and the probability to rebid a second time. One
observation is therefore again the combination auction·bidders.
Only reasonably high bids Only first bids above 60% of the actual final
price are considered.
Only max-bids In the auction bidders can chose to bid the next increment
(as a first price auction) or a higher max-bid (a proxy bid). Only bids
above the next increment are considered.
Only low second bids If the bid increases from the first bid to the second
bid is higher than 20%, the first bid is unlikely to be a representation
of WTP and is therefore disregarded.
Not too many bids Bidding more than 5 times in total in the auction in-
dicates that the first bid is unlikely to represent WTP and is therefore
disregarded.
Not fast rebidding Rebidding within minutes indicates that this is not
a pseudo-endowment effect but perhaps in stead auction fever. Only
bids that have not be increased within 4 hours are included.
14Although Ariely et al. (2004) call it quasi-endowment effect, Prelec (1990) was the
first to name it pseudo-endowment in another context.
100
Naturally, the limit of each criteria is arbitrary, but all the limits have no
significant effect on the resulting endowment effect, in a sensitivity analy-
sis as reported in Appendix D. The exception is the last criteria as fast
rebidding can reverse the effect. However, fast rebidding could be a sign
of auction fever. As argued in Bramsen (2008b) high intensity rebidding is
in that case expected to dominate a slower underlying pseudo-endowment
effect. I therefore see this as a confirmation rather than a problem.
With this selection the remaining number of observations (first bids) is
11,511 (Nsub). The distribution between the five groups can be found in
Table 1. The selection of max-bids means that the average ratio of bidders
rebidding after the first bid decreases from 50.18% to 24.51%.
The idea is basically to ask if pseudo-ownership (in some form) affects the
probability for bidders to rebid a second time if their first bid is outbid.
The answer goes through a logit regression. More precisely, if yi is a binary
variable being 1 if bidder i rebids and 0 if bidder i does not rebid if outbid,
then yi can be represented by a binomial distribution where yi ∼ B(1, pi)
for i = 1, .., N . I assume that pi can be described using a logit model where
pseudo-ownership is an explanatory variable15.
As the main objective in Bramsen (2008b) is to establish the pseudo-endowment
effect, experienced bidders are disregarded based on the assumption that
experience could make the effect less clear. The idea with this section is
basically to follow the same approach, but for all bidders, and to focus ex-
plicitly on the effect of experience. The general specification of the logit
model here is therefore:
ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
= f(experiencei · pseudo-endowmenti) + g(controlsi) + ǫi
where ǫi is a random stochastic variable. I will use a simple linear spec-
ification of f() and g(). The controlling variables of g() can be found in
Appendix B.
In Bramsen (2008b) two measures of pseudo-endowment are found to have
effect on the probability to rebid when outbid. One measure is the amount
of time that a bidder has the leading bid before being outbid. This corre-
sponds nicely to the observation by Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) who
observed that the endowment effect is enhanced with duration of ownership.
The other measure is “Depth” of ownership. Depth is defined as the amount
between the current auction price and the max-bid of the bidder. If for
15Actually, i represent the combination of bidder and auction in the first model, but
only the bidder in the second model as explained below.
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instance the bidder puts in a max-bid of $1000 and the previous leading
bidder’s max is $400, the current price will increase to $420 ($400 plus
an increment) and the Depth will be $1000-$420 = $580. A bidder must
generally be more optimistic about the probability to win the lower the
current price and the higher the depth. Depth must therefore be a proxy of
the expectation to win.
These two measure can be combined in what can be characterized as an
“Area of pseudo-endowment”. An example of such an Area is shown in
Figure 6 where our bidder from before is outbid after periods with prices of
$420, $680 and $740. The main result of Bramsen (2008b) is that the loga-
rithm to this area is the best determination of the pseudo-endowment effect.
Thus, a larger area predicts a higher probability to rebid if outbid16. The
question I ask here is therefore if the “Area of pseudo-endowment” is equally
important for the probability to rebid as bidders get more experienced.
I use the 5 groups as described in Table 1 as specification of experience.
Thus, the logit regression is an estimation of group specific pseudo-endowment
effects: groupi · ln(Area). The full result can be found in Appendix C, but
Figure 7 shows the pseudo-endowment effects for the 5 groups with 95%
confidence bands.
16It is somewhat ambiguous when the area is zero. This could either be because the
bidder was outbid right away or because the current price equals the bidder’s max bid. If
the latter is the case the bidder will still feel some sort of ownership. In this case I have
added a dummy to absorb the pseudo-endowment effect.
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Figure 7: Estimated effects from logit regressions
The logit regression needs to be slightly more complicated than that of
Bramsen (2008b). First of all, as some bidders are represented with a large
number of bids the possible correlation between these bids must be taken into
account.“Cluster” is estimated using a robust variance estimator making the
standard deviations slightly larger than in a simple logit regression.
Another possible modification is that bidders should count equally in the re-
gression regardless of the number of auctions they participate in. “Weighted”
is therefore a logit model were the bids are down-weighted such that all bid-
ders only count as one in the subset. Effectively the data set therefore
consists of 5449 bidders in stead 11,511 first bids.
In my opinion the right result is intuitively somewhere in between the two
models, as you can also argue that more important bidders should have
more influence on the result. Either way, both models show that the pseudo-
endowment effect does not disappear with experience. In both models the
group effect of “Professionals”, that participated in more than 200 furniture
auctions in 2005, is highly significant.
As expected there is some tendency of the pseudo-endowment effect to di-
minish through experience, but especially in the Cluster model this tendency
is weak. It also seems that the effects are stronger if the bids are Weighted,
but as other parameters also change from one model to the other, these
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parameters cannot be directly compared.
Statistically, the relevant question is if the groups are necessary when de-
scribing the pseudo-endowment effect of a bidder. I test this hypothesis in
a Wald-test. For the Cluster model the result is a P-value of 0.1723 and for
the Weighted model the P-value is 0.00369. Thus, the Cluster model cannot
reject this hypothesis while the Weighted model can. In other words, one
model suggests that there is no statistically significant effect of experience,
while the other suggests that there is some.
To conclude, the observation from this part of the analysis is that bidders
may learn a little, but generally they will still be affected by the pseudo-
endowment effect regardless of their experience. From this perspective ex-
perience will therefore not lead to rationality.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The results in this paper are at face value ambiguous. By only looking at the
bidding it appears that bidders do learn to bid more optimal. They bid fewer
times, engage in fewer bidding wars and bid early in the auction perhaps
to scare off other bidders as suggested by Bramsen (2008a). However, even
experienced bidders are still affected by the pseudo-endowment effect. Yet,
these seemingly conflicting findings do correspond to other findings in the
literature.
There are a number of studies with evidence of learning by market expe-
rience. As mentioned in Section 3 there are several surveys on eBay data
showing that experience optimizes the bidding. Livingston (Forthcomming)
also finds that experienced bidders learn to take the reputation of sellers
into account when they decide to bid on eBay. On the endowment effect
List (2003) finds that experience in the trading of sports cards does, to some
extent, eliminate the endowment effects of these cards. Moreover, this learn-
ing effect appears to transfer over to the trading of other items like mugs
and candy bars (List, 2004).
Although bidders and traders do seem to learn, the evidence does not nec-
essarily suggest that they become rational. In laboratory experiments of
second-price auctions people learn to bid more consistently and like each
other, but they do not learn to use their dominant strategy (see e.g. Kagel
and Levin (1993), Garratt and Wooders (2004) and Noy and Rafaeli (2005)).
In stock markets traders value stocks higher once they own them and, al-
though this endowment effect is more pronounced for private traders, the
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effect does not disappear for institutional brokers. An even stronger obser-
vation is done by Haigh and List (2005) who find that professional stock
brokers exhibit more loss aversion than a control group of students. Thus,
it may not always be rationality that we learn in the market.
The underlying explanation may be found in the feedback as suggested by
Loomes et al. (2003). The classical argument is that market participants will
learn through experience. Yet, learning is not derived from experience per
se, but from the feedback you can get through experience. Some feedback
may push you towards rationality while other feedback may push you further
away. Although Loomes et al. (2003) focus on separating the two cases17
the main point here is that you can only learn what the feedback directly or
indirectly is teaching you. In light of this the conflicting evidence reported
here appears reasonable.
Of all feedback, negative feedback appears to be the most influential. In
Braga et al. (2006) it is actual losses in lotteries that reverse participants’
preferences for lotteries over sure outcomes. Even more relevant is the analy-
sis of newly registered eBay bidders by Wang and Hu (2007). They conclude
that above all it is the loosing experiences that develop these new bidders’
bidding behavior.
Learning by losing also seems to be the case for bidding on both eBay and
Lauritz.com. Beginners being outbid in the last second on eBay will learn to
use the dominating strategy of sniping. With the soft ending on Lauritz.com
the likely loss for a beginner is the intension of bidding late, but to forget.
The lesson here will be to save transaction costs and bid earlier with a max-
bid. Though, it can also be the case that feedback is limited to observing
the bidding of others. In that case learning is more a question of copying
behavior (herding).
When it comes to the pseudo-endowment effect there is, however, no feed-
back. You cannot learn by observing others, and the negative feedback from
paying “to much” is hidden. Once the bidders actually get to own the items
they will feel the endowment effect even stronger and not be able to recog-
nize their inflated WTP18. Even professional bidders may not realize their
own pseudo-endowment effect as the negative feedback is likely to be absent
or delayed. This is the case if the item is resold with a profit after all or if
the resale happens several month later. Yet, this reasoning is speculation
17When participants are corrected towards underlying rational preferences Loomes et al.
(2003) label this as the market discipline hypothesis. The contrary is when markets are
shaping behavior decoupled from rationality. This is labeled as the shaping hypothesis.
18Or at least they will have a hard time recognizing their mistake due to cognitive
dissonance.
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and the coupling between the auction and resale market is an obvious object
for further investigation.
Generally, the observations on experience and auction behavior is likely to be
a consequence of the feedback. When bidders learn to change their bidding
strategy they are likely to respond to negative feedback. And when bidders
have more difficulties learning their pseudo-endowment effect it is due to the
lack in feedback.
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APPENDIX
A Robustness of bidding behavior
In Section 3 the bidding behavior of five groups of bidders were analyzed.
However, group averages could potentially conceal substantial variation within
the groups. In order to check for such effects the data for each bidder is
plotted in Figure 8 to 11 with the level of participation on the x-axis with a
logistic scale. Group limits are indicated with thin broken lines. Moreover,
I have also added two smoothing-regressions such that the local average can
be observed. The difference in the two smoothing regressions is the degree
of smoothing where the dark grey line is more smoothing than the brighter
grey. In all four figures there do not seem to be major movements within
the groups. “Professional” (above 200) does seem to have some variation,
but this is mainly due to the small amount of bidders in this group.
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Figure 8: Auctions with late bids (last hour)
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Figure 9: Auctions with sniping bids (a bid within last 10 min)
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Figure 10: Auction with two bids within last 10 min (bidding war)
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Figure 11: Average number of bids (bidder)
B Controlling variables
The controlling variables are basically the same as in Bramsen (2008b).
Although the selection of first bids is supposed to be strict, other factor could
still affect the stated WTP (bid) resulting in a variation in the rebidding.
The factors I use in the logit regressions are:
Group More experienced bidders may in general be less likely to rebid. To
separate this effect from the pseudo-endowment effect, I use groups as
controls.
Experience Does basically the same as the individual group effect, but the
combination opens up for flexibility.
Time of entry If a bidder is looking for some special item she is more
likely to find it earlier in the auction period than bidders who are just
randomly searching. Hence, early bidders might have higher WTP.
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This is in itself not a problem if the bidder really bids her maximum
WTP. However, as the price is likely to be lower early in the auction
this can act as an anchor depressing the first bid. The probability to
rebid could for this reason be higher.
Valuation As mentioned in Section 2 Lauritz.com lists an estimate of the
final price to guide both the sellers and the buyers. For expensive
items (e.g. with a valuation of $4000) bidders might hesitate to put
in their true WTP. As a consequence they might be more inclined to
increase their bid later in the auction.
Price at entry A relative low price at entry compared to the actual value
(the final price) might depress the bidders entry bid—just as a high
valuation or early bids could do.
Basically, these last three controls are therefore taking an “anchoring effect”
into account.
C Result of logit regressions
The specific results of the logit regressions as reported in Section 4 can be
found in Table 3. I will briefly comment on the result for the controlling
parameters.
The independent group effect is decreasing as expected. Although the effect,
to a small extend, is counteracted with the “experience” control, the overall
conclusion is that more experienced bidders rebid less often in general.
The anchoring effects of “Time of entry” and “Price at entry” are also as
expected. Later entry and a higher price at entry will decrease the proba-
bility of rebidding. The effect of “Valuation” is the opposite as expected for
anchoring, but the effect is not significant.
The “Dummy” is part of the pseudo-endowment effect, and the result is ba-
sically that even when Depth=0, but still with a leading bid, it will create a
pseudo-endowment effect. Not to complicate the analysis and the interpre-
tation needlessly, I did not combine this caveat of the pseudo-endowment
effect with experience.
Further comments on the models and the results can be found in Section 4
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Parameters: Cluster Weighted
Intercept (Amateur) -1.06*** -1.52***
(0.15) (0.14)
Independent group effects:
Novice 0.16* 0.05
(0.06) (0.07)
Experienced -0.15 -0.12
(0.09) (0.10)
Semi-Prof -0.18 -0.23*
(0.11) (0.11)
Professional -0.25 -0.15
(0.28) (0.27)
Controls:
Experience (1/100) 0.025 0.039
(0.046) (0.048)
Time of Entry -0.053** 0.007
(0.017) (0.017)
Valuation (1/1000) -0.017 0.013
(0.053) (0.061)
Price/Valuation -0.58*** -0.39**
(0.12) (0.13)
Pseudo-endowment effects:
Dummy 1.31*** 2.09***
(0.29) (0.29)
Novice*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.100*** 0.147***
(0.017) (0.017)
Amateur*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.093*** 0.139***
(0.017) (0.017)
Experienced*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.085*** 0.140***
(0.019) (0.020)
Semi-Prof*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.086*** 0.116***
(0.018) (0.020)
Professional*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.076*** 0.098***
(0.017) (0.020)
Table 3: Development in the pseudo-endowment effect - Logit regressions
D Sensitivity analysis
The criteria to select the max-bids are based on my best estimates of the
bidding behavior, but they are of course arbitrary. To test for dependence
on the exact limits, Table 4 shows a sensitivity analysis where I vary one
restriction at the time. For every variation I have stated the group specific
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pseudo-endowment effect for the “Cluster” model and the number of obser-
vations in the sample (Nsub). Note that for most criteria the actual limit (in
bold) is not the one maximizing the pseudo-endowment effect. Furthermore,
the resulting pseudo-endowment effects in and between groups are quite ro-
bust. This is also true for the significant levels where all (except the two
last limits for time) are three star significant.
As mentioned, the exception is the criteria of time between first and second
bid. If I allow for a shorter period between bid and rebid, the sample will
at a point be dominated by another behavior, perhaps auction fever, and
the sign is changed. The same pattern was found in Bramsen (2008b) and I
think it basically confirms that this is not auction fever, but something else.
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